

# **Administrative Reform**

## **Theoretical Perspective**



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Mohammad Mohabbat Khan



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**Dedicated**

To

Professors Dwight Waldo, Karl Schmidt,  
Chester Newland and A. G. Ramos,  
my teachers at Syracuse University and  
University of Southern California for  
their invaluable support and guidance  
during my academic sojourn in the  
United States (1972-76)



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Mohammad Mohabbat Khan  
November 2016



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# 1

## Introduction

### Introduction to the First Edition

Administrative reform is a familiar term. Politicians, bureaucrats, scholars and concerned citizens all feel one time or another the need to bring some kind of reform in the administrative machinery of the government. Still conflicting views are offered as to what the term means. Controversy abounds as to why it is undertaken and also why its far-reaching proposals fail in the implementation stage. This explains the disinclination of scholars and practitioners of administrative reform to search for universal principles and an ideal solutions to overcome the manifold ills of bureaucratized and dehumanized administrative systems. It appears that there is a consensus that simplistic generalizations about administrative systems are risky and dangerous. The increasing expansion in the activities of the public sector, especially in the developing countries, have endowed tremendous power and wide ranging responsibilities in the bureaucrats. But the bureaucrats have turned out to be in most cases corrupt, inefficient, arrogant and oblivious of their responsibilities. Moreover, they harbour negative and hostile attitude towards public and are disdainful of political control. Public accountability is an anathema to them. Added to this, administrative structures in most countries have remained unchanged for decades with the result that these have become totally inadequate to cater to the needs of the citizenry. The combination of a castist/elitist bureaucracy with that of an age-old structure constantly remind one the urgent need for undertaking comprehensive and radical reforms but the prevalence of peculiar norms, values, rigid social stratification systems undeveloped political systems and uneven economic development usually abort such efforts. Frustration, despair and a sense of powerlessness pervade every strata, except the very rich and powerful, of the citizenry. So, the need for far reaching administrative reforms is keenly felt and desired by most but these hardly come by as the state apparatuses are controlled by the vested interests who occupy key positions in the state.

## II

In the first article, "Administrative Reform :An Overview" I survey the problems that plague the arena of administrative reform and suggest, after examining several definitions of the term, that *administrative reforms be defined as those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the bureaucratic system of a country intended to transform the existing and established practices behaviours, and structures within it*". I also distinguish between administrative reform and administrative development.

It is my opinion that administrative reform is to be viewed as a process for a fuller and clearer understanding of a reform cycle. The cycle begins with the awareness of the need for administrative reform, then goals and strategies are formulated to achieve the desired end and the process culminates with the implementation of the reform proposal. Though the sequences mentioned above may not actually be seen in each and every reform situation still it allows one to perceive a reform process meaningfully, Moreover, a process– oriented approach focuses on behavioural aspects as well as on structural ones. In other words, individual attitudes and organizational structures are emphasized upon.

I feel that implementation stage is the most crucial stage in any administrative reform as resistance develops there and most reforms are unceremoniously buried at this stage. The high attrition rate in the implementation of major administrative reforms can be considerably mitigated if public policy makers at the highest level are seriously committed to undertake three types of actions: first, a firm commitment by the government in power to implement the reforms accepted by it; second, adequate institutional mechanisms to safeguard the implementation of those reforms; and third, formulation of an operational plan to actually implement the already accepted reforms.

Jon S. T. Quah in "Administrative Reform : Conceptual Analysis" evaluates the existing literature on administrative reforms and shows that after all these years there is no consensus among scholars as to how the term should be defined. He feels quite justifiably that various definitions of the concept have in most cases failed to identify its goals and neglected its attitudinal and institutional aspects.

Quah, after eloquently arguing why Caiden's definition of administrative reform is to be rejected, defines it as *a deliberate attempt to change both (a) the structure and procedures of the public bureaucracy (i. e. reorganization or the institutional aspect) and (b) the attitudes and behavior of the public bureaucrats involved (i.e., the*



*attitudinal aspect*), in order to promote organizational effectiveness and attain national development goals". Quah's definition appears to be all-inclusive and an improvement on the past efforts. Moreover, his definition states, quite unequivocally, that administrative reform is undertaken to promote organizational effectiveness and to attain national development. However, laudible these may appear for administrative reform, this is not the case in many actual reform situations.

Like me, Quah also observes that adoption of comprehensive strategy is most appropriate when three variables-timing, leadership and risk acceptability are favourable and incremental strategy is to be considered when one or some of the variables are unfavourable.

Quah also examines how such factors as history, technology, culture, society and economy can become stumbling blocks in implementing administrative reforms.

Krishna Kumar Tummaia in his "Administrative Reform" begins with the premise that "modern state is a service state" and efficient administrative system is essential for it. And administrative reform is the means for those who believe in Anglo-American democratic values, to overcome bureaucratic inertia and conservatism and to induce public servants to equip themselves to serve efficiently the citizens of the present and the future.

Tummala distinguishes administrative reform from reorganization and change. He states and justifiably so that all reforms are changes but not all changes are reforms. Tummala claims that reform is normative as it entails efficiency and economy in administration; wider distribution of public services; vitality and effectiveness of the government; and intelligent and equitable adaptation to changing needs of society. Interestingly, all these are to be achieved through peaceful methods and without tampering with the tradition or the present. Obviously, administrative reform encompasses wider areas than reorganization.

Tummala rightly suggests that administrative reform, to be meaningful, must be viewed in the context of the stage of the development of the total society and place of legislators, public servants and citizens within it. In other words, administrative problems cannot be solved in isolation. One must be conversant with four factors, i.e., science, economics, bureaucracy and political participation.

The crucial question to Tummala is how to successfully carry on administrative reform as well as to facilitate transition. He suggests that this can be achieved either by adopting an ideological stand or by utilizing an incremental approach. He emphasizes that any administrative reform which ignores social, political, economic, administrative and cultural realities and fails to discover linkages among them is bound to produce reform ritualism and innocuous incrementalism.

Wesly E. Bjur and Gerald Gaiden in "Administrative Reform and Institutional Bureaucracies" argue that in the past administrative reformers made little effort to differentiate between reforming instrumental and institutional bureaucracies. Institutional bureaucracies are autonomous, independent of political control, accustomed and able to decide their own arrangement, resentful of administrative reform efforts and administrative reformers. It follows then that radically different reform strategies are to be devised for reforming institutional bureaucracies.

Bjur and Caiden taking my study of Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) as a case, point to the following factors which contribute to the institutionalization of a bureaucracy. These are: a strong ideological commitment, a traditionally oriented leadership elite, negative attitude towards politicians, a paternalistic attitude towards people and the elite character of the bureaucracy. Believing that there is no pure model of either institutional or instrumental bureaucracy and the difference between the two is one of degree, they advance the thesis that the extent of institutionalization of a public bureaucracy can be understood from such characteristics as age of the organization, lack of political responsiveness, lack of public accountability in decision making, application of administrative law, tenure rights and moral accuracy.

Bjur and Caiden observe rather pointedly and pertinently argue that reforming an institutional bureaucracy is a political task and reformers must be willing to make compromise and give concessions as each situation demands. They argue convincingly that to reform institutional bureaucracies one must be willing to question their legitimacy, autonomy and self-direction and place these along with their values and practices before public scrutiny.

Muhammad Anisuzzaman and myself in "Development" and "Administrative Reform" attempt to establish a relationship between development-political, administrative and economic— and administra-

tive reform though we realize that at the present stage of development in the social sciences it is not possible to reach a consensus as to the meaning and ingredients of development and perhaps much less about the role of administrative reform in it. Yet a survey of the literature confirms the argument that administrative reform significantly affects and moulds development.

We examine the meaning of development— political, administrative and economic and attempt to establish relationships and linkages among various facets of development. The wide-ranging analysis also includes discussion of such areas as development administration and the role of bureaucracy in political development.

Administrative reform has been viewed by us like Tummala from normative perspective. It is assumed that whenever a particular administrative reform is implemented it will do some good.

We advance the thesis on the basis of our knowledge of reform experiences in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh that the chief executive in any country is the administrative reformer. His value preferences and beliefs reign supreme specially when other competing institutions like the legislature, courts and interested civic bodies are either weak or absent. Therefore, it is suggested, especially in the context of developing countries, that an understanding of administrative reform presupposes knowledge about administrative doctrine of the reformer.

January 1981

### **Introduction to the Second Edition**

Administrative reform was first published in 1981. This edited volume has chapters contributed by eminent scholars in the field of administrative reform (AR). The book was well received by students and scholars alike. The book sold out long time back. There has been demand to publish the book once again.

In this edition a short introduction has been added to include some recent developments in the arena of administrative reform as it is not possible to include all the developments during last thirty- five years pertaining administrative reforms in a slender volume like the present one. This is a limitation that I believe the readers will understand.

This introduction aims to bring into focus some pertinent global developments that have affected administrative reform both as a concept and as a practice since the publication of the first edition of this volume over three decades ago.

AR is not a new concept. But it is in vogue for at least half a century. It is now well accepted that without wide-ranging administrative reforms it is not possible to face the challenges of globalization and cope with its multifarious demands. Administrative reforms and civil service reforms are considered in this context as interchangeable terms.

Reforms refer to intended or designed changes into established or routine ways of life, of the ways organizations perform, of governance, administration, and management (Farazmand, 2007, p. 354). Reform may be profound fundamental alteration of the existing system or may simply be a surgical alteration in the system of organization and administration, government and politics (Farazmand, 2007, p.354).

AR is a political issue and is influenced by the realities of bureaucratic politics. Reforms in this context assumes constant power struggle between politicians in power and senior bureaucrats. In the South Asian countries public service performance and management improvement are hostage to overriding forces associated with the character of governance and nature of society in general (Blunt, nd).

There are intrinsic constraints and limits to administrative reform and the reform process is beset with dilemmas and paradoxes of intervening decisions and inter-organizational linkages (See, 2007).

The outcome of administrative reform should result in an efficient and effective public sector service structure, improvement of public sector operational performance and economic development (Caiden, 1991).

Institutionalizing administrative changes/reforms aimed at increasing citizen participation in public management tend to be lengthy and difficult than consolidating managerialist reforms (Heredia and Schneider, 1998).

Institutionalizing AR depends on politicians in power to considerably relinquish their discretionary power over the bureaucrats. Though institutionalization of AR is difficult but the existence of certain conditions facilitate the process. These are: financial scarcity, merit -based recruitment and promotion and emergence and sustenance of anti-patronage electoral constituencies.

Participatory reforms usually enhance administrative costs by enlarging the number of participants and lengthening the process of policy formulation. These reforms are invariably strongly resented and stubbornly resisted by most bureaucrats specially the senior ones

because citizen participation provides both political superiors with alternative sources of information concerning their behavior. Also as an enforcement and monitoring device citizen participation is not quite as effective as market competition primarily because it does not act as a reliable self-enforcing mechanism.

AR has critical role to play in governance. Governance and more specifically, its derivative good governance (GG), calls for adherence to some normative principles like accountability, morality, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, participation and democratization and these cannot be achieved without demonstrated political will and a thorough overhaul and redesigning of a country's governance system and particularly its administrative apparatuses. Among other things, the crucial role of administrative reform in the entire process is understood and appreciated. Good governance and development are interrelated both conceptually and practically. Without development, GG will not take place. More specifically, development is the macro framework within which good governance essentials can be made operational.

AR is also linked to development. Development in the broader sense means human development and construction of a livable society for all mankind. Development is a collective process in which the interests and concerns of the entire population is taken into consideration. Development encompasses not only social, economic, political, cultural but also moral aspects. Fruits of development are to be shared equitably by all citizens of a country. AR, on the other hand, aims at thorough overhaul of a country's entire administrative system in order to transform the existing and established practices, behaviors, and structures within it. This way of viewing administrative reform has profound implications for a country's development. As without a committed and competent civil service system, a broad-based and people-centered development is neither feasible nor possible.

Six different yet interrelated dimensions need to be taken into consideration given the changing landscape in public administration worldwide during last three to four decades. These are: challenges, values, governance, design, power, and impact of reform (Toonen, 2012).

It is important that reformers should be preoccupied not only with steering capacity and capability of public sector organizations but also with steering representativeness, legitimacy, and trust relations. The main challenge here is to design organizational forms that enhance both representativeness and capacity of governance.

Good governance and administrative reform issues have become closely connected and form the basis of development debate today. Good governance and administrative reforms are moulded by their

surrounding environments. Among others location, size of the economy, market configuration, community perceptions and social and political history are all determining factors (Ray, 1999:366). So administrative reforms can be understood better if studied taking into consideration international influence, policy diffusion, domestic politics, institutional dynamics, and administrative traditions and legacies (Cheung, 2005: 257).

Based on his extensive field research and consultancy experience in three developing countries, i.e. East Timor, India, and Lebanon Blunt (nd) makes a number of pertinent observations and recommendations pertaining governance constraints affecting public administration reforms. These are: few quick fix or readymade solutions to complex development problems not available; innovation reforms not be confused with fashion or fad; realization that chronic poor performance in the civil service all symptoms of deeper and wider problems in the governance system as a whole; and questions of political will and societal culture set the ground rules and limits for civil service reform and management reform (Blunt: 11).

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# 2

## Administrative Reform: An Overview

Mohammad Mohabbat Khan

Administrative reform, as a term, has been much used and abused. Writers on administrative reform, after years of constant effort, have failed to agree on a theoretical framework under which it can be studied and analyzed. Worse still, recently, serious doubts have been raised as to the rationale behind the use of the term 'administrative reform' itself and suggestions have been offered to substitute it by using a more comprehensive term like reorganization of the machinery of government'.<sup>1</sup>

The discontent and frustrations that have developed over the years about the use of the term 'administrative reform' can be attributed to several factors, One of the rhetoric that is often heard in any reform effort is that it is intended to improve upon the existing situation by aiming to create a good administration which clearly has a normative element. Contrary to these pious wishes, what actually happens in many real situations is entirely a different thing. Many reforms have no other purpose than to strengthen the position of certain power holders, and reform actors are strongly inspired by influence and power motives.<sup>2</sup> The traditional use of the term has left an impression that a clear cut distinction can be made between changes in the bureaucracy and those in the organization of the political executive organs. As one observer aptly remarks. "In fact, it may well be that administrative reform has lost its grip on the imagination of the political scientists because it has ignored the conceptual problems involved in adapting static models of administrative perfection to dynamic political reality".<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>. A. F. Leemans, "Overview," in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed. Arne F. Leemans, The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p.8.

<sup>2</sup>. *Ibid*,

<sup>3</sup>. J. D. Montgomery, "Sources of Bureaucratic Reforms: Typology of Purpose and Politics," in *Political and Administrative Development*, ed. R. Braibanti, Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1969, p. 427.

Many so-called administrative reforms have implied considerable changes in the structure and processes of political executive organs and in their relationship with the administrative machinery.<sup>4</sup> It has been observed that changes in power structures within and among political executive organs induce changes in the administrative machinery many of which are inspired by purely political consideration.<sup>5</sup>

Recent discussions show considerable awareness of the need to view administrative reform as a sub-system of a wider societal system which includes a political sub-system. The interactions between and among the administrative and political sub-systems are crucial and to a large extent determine the setting up of objectives, goals, strategies, and probabilities of success of the implementation of the administrative reform proposals. Experiences of some developing countries point to a dilemma which has not been properly dealt with as yet.<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, there is increasingly a growing need to undertake comprehensive reform programs to keep in pace with complex social, economic and political situations which most developing countries must cope with in order to survive let alone prosper. Comprehensive reforms, in practice, have been found to be extremely difficult to implement, on the other.

Another factor which has obstructed the formulation of a theoretical framework with general applicability is the place of contextuality in the success or failure of any reform effort. Developing countries differ vastly among themselves regarding their administrative systems (i.e., composition, and capability), political systems (i.e., absolute monarchy, dictatorship, one-party rule, multiparty democratic system), economic conditions (i.e., stage of economic development), and cultural heritage. These wide-ranging differences and consequently,

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<sup>4</sup> Leemans, "Overview", p. 7.

<sup>5</sup> R. T. Groves, "Administrative Reform and Political Development," in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed. A. F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 99-113.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, the experiences of Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Venezuela in administrative reforms; A. Gorvine, "Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change," in *Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change*, in *Administrative Problems in Pakistan* ed. G. S. Birkhead. Syracuse, N. Y. Syracuse University Press, 1966; and V.V. Moharir. "Administrative Reforms in India," pp. 238-51. D. Hadisumarto and G. B. Siegel, "The Optimum Strategy Matrix and Indonesian Administrative Reforms," pp. 252-71, A.C. Castro, "Administrative Reform in Mexico," pp. 185-212, A. R. B. Carias, "Administrative Reform Experience in Venezuela 1959-'75," in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed. A. F. Leemans, The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.



the futile attempts to develop an all-embracing and universal strategy to study administrative systems have been widely recognized. Lawrence and Lorsch opine that an optimal change model for a particular case should be "conditional on the task to be done, the environmental conditions to be handled and the characteristics of the individual contributors involved."<sup>7</sup> Basil and Cook maintain that a "categorization of environmental states is a prerequisite to developing strategies for change."<sup>8</sup> Dror hypothesizes that "the preferable mix of administrative reform strategies is in the main a function of the concrete circumstances of each particular reform."<sup>9</sup> Cohen emphasizes the uniqueness of each situation, which results in the demand by each to use its own approach suited to the particular situation at hand and builds strategic models on the basis of three variables: task, organizational form, and personal characteristics.<sup>10</sup> Esman, in his authoritative study of administrative reform in Malaysia, concurs with the view that each situation requires its own strategy.<sup>11</sup>

The rejection of universal strategies need not exclude the design of strategic models for the management of induced change which have some degree of validity for similar reform situations and objects. Lee<sup>12</sup> and Cohen<sup>13</sup> provide typologies which suggest that a broad model of reform strategy can be designed to study divergent types of reform situations.

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<sup>7</sup> P. R. Lawrence and J.W. Lorsch, *Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action*, Reading, Mass; Addison-Wesley, 1969, p. 88.

<sup>8</sup> D. C. Basil and C. W. Cook, *The Management of Change*, London; McGraw Hill Book Co., 1974, p, 205.

<sup>9</sup> Y. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed., A. F. Leemans, The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1976. p. 127.

<sup>10</sup> A. R. Cohen, "The Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform: Towards More Differentiated Strategies for Change," in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed. A. F. Leemans. The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff. 1975 pp. 165-81.

<sup>11</sup> The Malaysian reform was based on four strategic principles: "(a) working within the existing structure; (b) giving priority to central government wide processes rather than to specific operating programs; (c) an approach to induce social change which had been identified in recent years as institution building; (d) emphasis on technological instruments for including organizational and behavioral changes, but supporting technological with cultural and political methods." J. Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia*, Ithaca : Cornell University Press. 1972.

<sup>12</sup> H-B Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform," in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed. A. F. Leemans, The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 114-25.

<sup>13</sup> Cohen, "Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform," pp. 165-81.

## Administrative Reform Defined

Administrative reform, as a term, has been defined differently by different writers depending on their focus of attention. Thinking on administrative reform can be traced during the fifties when systematic efforts were made to export technical help and know-how to the developing countries from the developed ones in order to strengthen the administrative capabilities of the former, but intellectual discussion did not reach its zenith until the sixties. In spite of the growing attention in recent years, administrative reform still remains conceptually deficient. This can be attributed partially to the inability of the people writing on it to differentiate the term from other related terms.

It is evident that the term administrative reform has acquired widespread usage and recognition in the literature pertaining to government and public administration, Caiden defines it as "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance."<sup>14</sup> Administrative reform, according to Caiden, contains three interrelated properties : moral purpose (which points to the need for improving the status quo), artificial transformation (which leads to a considerable departure from existing arrangements), and administrative resistance (when opposition is assumed).<sup>15</sup> He also distinguishes between administrative reform and administrative change by saying that the latter is a self-adjusting organizational response to fluctuating conditions while the need for the former arises from the latter because of the malfunctioning of the natural processes of administrative change,<sup>16</sup> To Dror, administrative reform is "directed change of the main features of an administrative system."<sup>17</sup> This definition gives the term an objective reference and an ordinal scale of measurement. His two principal attributes of reform are goal orientation (directed, conscious) and the comprehensiveness of change, so that reform can be considered in terms of its scope (number of administrative components affected) and the rate of change (time required to bring about the desired changes).<sup>18</sup> Hahn Been Lee views

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<sup>14</sup> G. E. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, Chicago : Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, p. 65.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58, 65-67.

<sup>17</sup> Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," p. 127.

<sup>18</sup> R. Backoff, "Operationalizing Administrative Reform for Improved Governmental Performance," *Administration and Society*, 6, May 1974, 75.

administrative reform as a complex process in which many factors interact and affect one another and whose results can be found over a considerable period of time.<sup>19</sup> Lee broadens his ideas about administrative reform and proceeds to show its link with innovation by declaring that administrative reform involves new values and modes of behavior to accommodate new ideas within an organizational context. Administrative reform is considered normative as it calls for improvement upon the existing order.<sup>20</sup>

Administrative reform is generally used to describe activities which actually go far beyond its evident meaning. It is conceived as directed action. Administrative reform is defined here as *those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the bureaucratic system of a country intended to transform the existing and established practices, behaviors, and structures within it.*

Reorganization and administrative development are usually used inter-changeably along with administrative reform to convey the same meaning. This is not surprising as reorganization literally means organizing some things differently from what was the case in the past. Reform has literal origins in the giving of new and different form to something, and translating those terms in organization vocabulary signifies new organizational structure. "Reform has a strong normative connotation. Reorganization though somewhat restricted and precise in its definition, has come to acquire nearly the same meaning in the American culture, both in its descriptive and in its normative senses."<sup>21</sup> Reorganization is conscious, deliberate intended, and planned and intends to bring about significant changes in the existing state of the system.<sup>22</sup>

Administrative development is viewed as the growing capability of the administrative system to cope continuously with problems created by social change toward the goal of achieving political, economic, and social progress.<sup>23</sup> To Riggs, administrative development reflects the

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<sup>19</sup> H-B. Lee, "An Application of Innovation Theory to the Strategy of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries," *Policy Sciences 1*, Summer 1970, 1977-89.

<sup>20</sup> Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform," p. 114,

<sup>21</sup> F. C. Mosher, "Some Notes on Reorganizations in Public Agencies," in *Public Administration and Democracy*, ed. R.C. Martin, Syracuse, N. Y. : Syracuse University Press, 1965, 129.

<sup>22</sup> F. C. Mosher, ed. *Governmental Reorganization: Cases and Commentary*, Indianapolis : The Bobbs Merrill Co. Inc., 1967; 497.

<sup>23</sup> J. Khan, "Administrative Change and Development in Barbados," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 41, 1975: 149.

capacity of administrative systems to make choices and to exercise discretion to bring about environmental changes by deliberate programs and self-conscious decisions.<sup>24</sup> Administrative development entails the assumption of greater responsibility on the part of the governmental bureaucracy to bring about broader and macro-changes which touch all sectors of the society. Administrative development is also normative as it is considered an intrinsically meaningful to the development process.

The motive behind any reorganization effort and administrative development program is to bring a change in the present state of the administrative system which will enhance its capacity to undertake and perform complex functions as they emerge. It is said that overall development in administration is achieved by administrative reform programs.

*First, reform proposals challenge bureaucratic inertia and reactionary administrators and although defense mechanisms may temporarily suppress change, things can never quite be the same and peace tokens have to be made if the situation is to be kept in hand. Second, reform programs attract enterprising administrative talent and provide valuable experience for a new generation of administrative aspirants. Third, reforms promote badly needed administrative modernization which is likely to set up a chain reaction in functional reforms as changes in techniques, skills and attitudes in specialized fields seem more attainable than possibly the harder changes to carry through in administration, Fourth, constructive progressive forces find openings for their respective creative talent in empirical problem-solving, particularly the kind presented in administrative reform... Fifth... any effort to transform administrative systems is to be commended in the face of official indifference, technical ignorance, political intransigence and public apathy.<sup>25</sup>*

### **Administrative Reform as a Process**

Administrative reform is viewed in this context as a process. It is believed that a process-oriented study provides a greater understanding and a useful framework to analyze the phenomenon of administrative

<sup>24</sup> F. W. Riggs. "Introduction," in *Frontiers of Development Administration*, ed. Fred W. Riggs, Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1971 : 25-26.

<sup>25</sup> G. E. Caiden, "Development, Administrative Capacity and Administrative Reform," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 38, 1973: 343.

reform in a sequential manner. Any study of administrative reform must begin with the understanding of awareness of the need for reform and conclude with a discussion of the problems relating to the implementation of such efforts.

Several advantages can be noted if administrative reform is considered a process. Process carries with it wider implications than the content of the reform. In other words, behavioral aspects are emphasized along with the structural ones to make a study of any administrative reform more comprehensive. Cohen describes the role of the reformer in the process approach this way.

- i. ...The way the reformer goes about making changes is at least as important as the specific changes recommended.
- ii. ...If a reformer wants to create more responsible, responsive and initiating civil servants, the reformer himself must begin immediately to behave that way.
- iii. The reformer must not only arrive at good answers but must work in a way that is consistent with the desired changes.<sup>26</sup>

A process-oriented approach takes into consideration and gives high priority to the human variable in the reform. At the same time, it demands that reformers must be more knowledgeable, concerned, and involved to bring about the relevant changes.

Caiden disagrees with the notion that process approach is most suitable to study administrative reform. Instead, he opts for systems approach and says that "reform of any administrative system should begin with an analysis of the system rather than an analysis of the reform process."<sup>27</sup> Caiden thinks that the process approach is too narrow in its scope and in the end is unable to consider sources and dynamics of administrative behavior within the context of an administrative system. Contrary to Caiden's thinking, it can be argued that the process approach is comprehensive in its scope and does include and focus on the interaction between and among individuals and organizations and thereby throws light on the dynamics of administrative behavior.

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<sup>26</sup>. Cohen, "Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform, 172-173.

<sup>27</sup>. G. E. Caiden, "Impact and Implications of Administrative Reform for Administrative Behavior and Performance," *International Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*. New York : United Nations, 1973, Vol. 2. Technical Papers, 27.

### **Awareness of the Need for Administrative Reforms**

Major administrative reforms are usually direct outcomes of very serious crisis conditions faced by the government. The conditions which necessitate change of such magnitude are the following:

1. The takeover of power, through revolution or otherwise, by political groups who differ strongly from those previously in office.
2. (Semi-) revolutionary developments inspired by violent dissatisfaction with the operations of government including the the machinery of bureaucracy,
3. Grave developments in the environment such as war (or threat of war), economic depression, sharp demands which have strong political support (i.e., for the autonomy of parts of the country).
4. The need for drastic cuts in government expenditure.
5. Maladministration which does not clearly affect the relationship with the environment but is perceived as excessive annoyance by groups within the government.<sup>28</sup>

The awareness of administrative reform arises with the realization that the present organizational set-up is unable to meet its obligations adequately when a particular administrative system cannot keep in pace with time and fails to make necessary adjustments over a period of time. As a result, its components become maladjusted.

Combination of a number of different and identifiable factors over a period of time will push for major structural changes to rectify the maladies in the existing administrative system. These factors are:

*Growth in size of the clientele served ; changes in problems and needs and, therefore, in organizational programs and responsibilities; changing philosophy as to the proper responsibilities of governments; (result of) new technology, new equipment and advancing knowledge; changing and usually rising qualifications of personnel (i.e., increasing need for specialists), basic policy changes at top level forces change.*<sup>29</sup>

### **Formulation of Goals and Strategies of Administrative Reform**

When the awareness for reform is clearly felt and understood, the logical step that follows is to decide what needs to be done and how that can be accomplished. No reform process can be complete without a clear perception of the role of goals and strategies within it.

<sup>28</sup>. Leemans, "Overview" 16-17.

<sup>29</sup>. Mosher, ed., *Governmental Reorganization*, 494-96.

There is a clear consensus among practitioners and academicians that desired goals for any administrative reform must be set as clearly and as clearly as possible. It is essential in order to determine the appropriate strategies. Also, without specification of goals, it will not be possible to determine the extent of success or failure of the reform.

Goals<sup>30</sup> can be divided into external and internal categories. This typology has the advantage of indicating the nature of the reform suggested. Dror, following the same line of thinking, distinguishes between the two principal categories: "(a) intra-administration directed goals which are primarily concerned with improving the administration, and (b) objectives dealing with the societal roles of the administrative system, and with changing policies and programs."<sup>31</sup>

In many circumstances, internal and external goals remain closely interrelated<sup>32</sup> and pose problems to efforts which intend to differentiate between them, The former are usually set as means towards the greater attainment of external goals, i.e., to realize certain societal situations or relationships, or to increase and improve outputs.

External goals have been specified in general terms in administrative reform programs in many countries. These mostly concern the revitalization of the administrative system to bring about wide-ranging social and economic development. At the same time, political realities must be taken into consideration in setting goals.

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<sup>30</sup>. In the literature, goals and objectives are used interchangeably and we agree to such usage.

<sup>31</sup>. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," Dror very rightly says that administrative reform is a multi-goal-oriented behavior which necessitates categorization of goals.

<sup>32</sup>. In describing goals of reorganization, Mosher uses a mixed approach. He classifies goals into four main categories: (1) those having to do with changing policy and program, which equate with shifting of agency purpose; (2) those intended to improve administrative effectiveness in carrying out existing responsibilities; (3) those directed specifically to problems of personnel, individuals or groups and (4) those intended to counter or respond to pressures and threats from outside the organization Mosher, ed., *Governmental Reorganization*, 497. Also see Grosenick and Mosher. whose categorization of goals defies any classification. They define goals in terms of continuum-western versus traditional, development versus efficiency, stabilization and legitimacy versus rapid institutional change, primary (direct or short-term) versus secondary indirect or long-term goals. Grosenick and Mosher, "Administrative Reform: Goals, Strategies, Instruments and Techniques" *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*. 11-13,

Internal goals have been associated with the attainment of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within an organizational context.<sup>33</sup> Reduction of unnecessary governmental expenditure on trivial administrative activities has been another goal of administrative reform. All these are intended to bring about significant improvements in administrative systems.

Experience has shown that there is a sea of difference between formal or official goals and informal and individual goals of particular reformers which sometimes may be not only dissimilar but contradictory. Commenting on the Philippine experiences in administrative reform, Abueva charges that undeclared goals of reformers were personal advancement, empire-building, and elimination of rivals.<sup>34</sup>

Strategy is one of those elements in the process of administrative reform whose significance is well recognized, but at the same time little effort has been made until recently to define it or circumscribe it.<sup>35</sup> To complicate the matter further, strategy has been subjected to different interpretations.<sup>36</sup> Dror is one of the first scholars to undertake an in-depth study of strategy in the context of administrative reform and to provide a conceptual framework for further elaboration and clarification. He defines it as mega policies which lays down the framework of guidelines and the boundaries of policy space within which operational and detailed policies are to be established and decisions are to be made.<sup>37</sup> Strategy implies defining the goal boundaries of a desired or intended activity, as opposed to tactics which refer to details of policy programs.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>. United Nations Report on major reforms specially challenges the first to goals, saying that "the achievement of efficiency and economy in public administration as reform goals could not be taken as objectives themselves. *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries* Vol 1, Report of the Seminar, 10.

<sup>34</sup>. See H. B. Lee and A. G. Samonte, eds. *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, Manila: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970, Chapter 2,

<sup>35</sup>. See R. Chin and K.D. Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Change in Human Systems," in *The Planning of Change*, ed. W. G. Bennis, K. D. Bennis, and R. Chin, New York : Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969; p. 32-59.

<sup>36</sup>. Strategy can also mean : a detailed set of planned responses to all possible contingencies in theory of games, fundamental policies, and overall postures in strategic analysis dealing with foreign relations and defense: and main goals and principles for operations which serve as a framework for 'tactics' in military planning. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," 126,

<sup>37</sup>. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform,"

<sup>38</sup>. Leemans quotes C.J. Zwart in "Overview," Mosher differentiates between strategy and tactics differently and defines the former as the selection of one



In line with our definition, strategies in the context of administrative reform must therefore deal with issues such as: "Overall goals of administrative reforms; the boundaries of administrative reforms; preference in respect to time, risk acceptability; choice between more? In line with our definition, strategies in the context of administrative reform must therefore deal with issues such as: "Overall goals of administrative reforms; the boundaries of administrative reforms; preference in respect to time, risk acceptability; choice between more incremental or more innovative reform; preference for more balanced vs. more shock-directed reforms; relevant assumptions on the future; theoretic (trait or explicit) assumptions on which the reform is based; resources available for the administrative reform; and the range of feasible reform instruments."<sup>39</sup>

Strategies have also been viewed from a sequential, logical angle which presupposes careful consideration of several factors which sometimes must be carried out simultaneously. These are as follows:

1. research and analysis of the current situation;
2. analysis and discussion leading to general consensus on needs and goals;
3. forecasting of the future setting of public administration, including the political, economic and social environment, and the probable availability of resources available to administration, as well as to its reform;
4. development of alternative plans of administrative reforms;
5. analysis of and, where possible, experimentation with alternative plans, their costs and benefits, including social costs and benefits;
6. decision to proceed on best feasible plan;
7. implementation; and
8. continuing feedback on consequences and modification of plan as indicated.<sup>40</sup>

Though strategies, to a great extent, determine the fate of administrative reforms has been clearly pointed out by a seminar on

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or two or three key factors most likely to 'unfreeze' the conditions of resistance while the latter as the methods and techniques employed. *Government Reorganization*, 502

<sup>39</sup> Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform," 126.

<sup>40</sup> Grosnick and Mosher, "Administrative Reform Goals, Strategies, Instruments and Techniques," 14-15.

major administrative reforms;<sup>41</sup> efforts to identify and operation aisle one particular strategy as a model to all developing countries has not been successful.<sup>42</sup> The preferable mix of administrative reform strategies is, in the main, the function of the concrete circumstances of each particular reform situation. The best strategy is determined contextually, dependent on and dictated by the special circumstances obtaining in a particular country.

### **Implementation the Achilles Heel of Administrative Reform**

Most reforms fail at the implementation stage.<sup>43</sup> The age-old advice generally given to the reformers is to keep in mind the interests of politicians and various affected interests within the administrative system so as to obtain the support of these people to facilitate the implementation of the reforms. The blessing of political authorities and cooperation of civil servants (those who perceive real or imaginary threats that they will be adversely affected by the reform) are a must to overcome the greatest hurdles to the success of any reform effort. The difficult position of the reformer in the context of reform implementation is obvious.

*The reformers remain outsiders to the situation they are trying to improve. They have no power, position, status to influence those who can change things or they have no access to people who do have influence, or they have no impact on people who have to be convinced. Even highly prestigious bodies invested with the task of reform discover that nobody else really has any intention of doing anything about their proposals and they are being used to bury a burning issue, not for remedial action, When reformers do something worthwhile to propose and action is intended, they find that administrative systems are extremely conservative, no matter what the recognized value of their suggestion.<sup>44</sup>*

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<sup>41</sup>. The United Nations Report puts in this way: "The frequency with which administrative reform efforts had failed in the past demonstrated the difficulty of making them effective without good reform strategies and the importance of devising appropriate strategies to carry them out." *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, 13.

<sup>42</sup>. (Mukarji reviewing the Indian experience in administrative reform, comments, "There can be no universal strategy for administrative modernization (reform), but rather separate strategies for each country. N.K. Mukarji, 'Formulation of Administrative Reform Strategies,' *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*,

<sup>43</sup>. Experiences of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh can be cited in this regard.

<sup>44</sup>. G. E. Caiden, 'Implementation...The Achilles Heel of Administrative Reform,' in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed., A.F. Leernans, The Hague: Mlartinus Nijhoff, 1976; 142.

The high attrition rate in the implementation of major administrative reforms has been considered as one of the most complex and frustrating problems faced by the scholars in the area. In response to this situation, two things have happened. On the one hand, deliberate attempts have been made to identify and analyze those factors and situations which prevent the implementation of reforms. On the other, strategies have been developed to facilitate the process of implementation.

Caiden provides a long list of factors and situations which must not only be understood but avoided as these result, in the failure of major administrative reforms.

*A bad beginning; imitation, not innovation; incorrect diagnosis, hidden intentions; indecisive approach; faulty planning, unduly restrictive techniques and instrumentalities, inability to command resources; absence of feedback; no monitoring; evaluation ignored; and goal displacement.*<sup>45</sup>

Lee is one of those few who have tried time and again to come up with a strategy which will increase the probability of success of a reform effort.

Lee considers the degree of implementation as a function of the social environment, the political structure, the reform agents, the reform agency, and the reform strategy.<sup>46</sup> He posits two reform strategies: (a) the comprehensive, and (b) the selective. A comprehensive strategy can be implemented if the leadership of reform agents and the internal structure of the reform agency are strong and if the social environment and political structure are favorable. A selective strategy can be implemented if either: (1) the leadership is strong but the situation is unfavorable, or (2) the situation is favorable but the leadership is weak. It follows, then, if the leadership is weak and at the same time, the situation is unfavorable, no strategy can be expected, to be effective. In Lee's matrix, time and leadership are two crucial variables which deserve wider attention.

Lee, in his most recent writing on the subject, has attempted to relate the types of reforms and the kinds of existing bureaucracies.<sup>47</sup> He

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<sup>45</sup> Caiden, 'Implementation,' 145-164. What gives credibility to Caiden's list is his exhaustive use of case studies drawn from many countries in the continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

<sup>46</sup> Lee, 'An Application of Innovation Theory to the Strategy of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries.'

<sup>47</sup> Lee, 'Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform,' Lee's typology can be presented like this:

argues on the basis of the experience of many countries that programmatic reforms have better probabilities of success as these admirably suit the needs of closed bureaucracies which can be found in most of the developing countries. In other words, to enhance the possibilities of implementation, reformers must have a clear understanding of the nature, type and objective of reform as well as the stage of bureaucratic development.

Butani goes beyond Lee, and quite correctly so, to point out that the creation of appropriate environment for the facilitation of the process of reform implementation presupposes the creation, sustenance, and spread of appropriate attitudes in men who matter most—men who occupy positions in the administrative hierarchy from where the consequences of good or bad leadership emerge and permeate the entire structure.<sup>48</sup> Butani, in answering a hypothetical question as to how administrative innovations and reforms can be implemented with speed and effectiveness, suggests awareness and understanding of four essential requirements. These are: implementers must get involved in the process as early as practicable; an adequate agency for follow-up action must be established; the urge to improve must come from within (whether from an individual or from the organization where reform is introduced) to have lasting improvements; and extreme care must be taken in the choice and training of personnel meant to undertake the implementation of reforms.

Butani's insight is valuable not only because he bases his writing on the administrative reform experience in India, but because of his emphasis on the important place an individual holds in success or failure of a reform effort. It must not be forgotten that he is one of those rare writers who have tried to explain the complexities of principal actor's attitudes and their effect on the surrounding environment which ultimately substantially affect the contemplated reforms.

Backoff, utilizing an innovative framework, uses the characteristics of administrative reform to predict the prospect of success in

<b>Reform Types</b>	<b>Reform Objectives</b>	<b>Kinds of Bureaucracies</b>
<b>Programmatic</b>	Improved Performance	Closed
<b>Technical</b>	Improved Method	Mixed
<b>Programmatic</b>	Improved Performance	
<b>Procedural</b>	Improved Order	Open

<sup>48</sup>. K.N. Butani, 'Implementing Administrative Innovations and Reforms', *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, XII July-September 1966; 612-617

implementing major administrative reforms.<sup>49</sup> The characteristics are: scope, magnitude of change, sequence of change, goals or objectives, reform instrument or means, and evaluation criteria.<sup>50</sup> It is hypothesized that the greater comprehensiveness, complexity, and magnitude of changes, the lesser the probability of implementation as there will be more resistance-organized and institutionalized.

The writings of Caiden, Lee, Butani, Backoff, and others, have greatly helped to clarify and operationalize the complexities that are found in the process of implementation, yet sizable gaps differentiate pious assumptions from the happenings in the real world in the study of administrative reform. Sometimes the gap is too great to distinguish between the ideal and the real, which eventually seriously dampens the prospect of implementation of reforms.

Caiden crystallizes the assumptions generally made consciously or unconsciously. These are

*First, that the government has recognized the need to improve its performance and is determined to do something effective; second, that the government has appointed acknowledged experts to identify the weakest points and to concentrate on those remedies likely to have the widest application; third, that the experts, with government backing are able to conduct full inquiries and publicize their efforts, whether in temporary ad hoc commissions or more lasting institutional arrangements; and fourth, that the experts are capable of doing a competent job.<sup>51</sup>*

In practice, things do not exactly follow the idealistic routine. Many governments only pay lip-service to reforms and have no real desire to see major reforms taking place but would like to talk about it because of political gains involved. The reform bodies are mostly (20) manned by incompetent people. Serious efforts are seldom made to maintain a balance between politicians, bureaucrats, academicians, and other outside experts when members are chosen. This uneven composition results in recommendations which are impractical and difficult to implement. Bureaucratic attitude have not changed, which prompts the perpetuation of negative and hostile attitudes toward any mention of change. Changes are always feared and frowned upon. Reformers have to be extremely fortuitous to expect cooperation from bureaucrats under these circumstances. And cooperation of bureaucrats is

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<sup>49</sup>. Backoff, 'Operationalizing Administrative Reform.'

<sup>50</sup>. For a more detailed discussion: see 85-94.

<sup>51</sup>. Caiden, 'Implementation, 144.

necessary to study the situation and eventually to make recommendations for change. Sometimes reformers are not qualified to perform the job that they undertake,

But it may be assumed that the above mentioned gap between the ideal and the real can be narrowed considerably, and the task of implementation will be smoother if the government gives serious attention to three types of actions: "First, a well-defined and bold policy, a firm decision on the part of political leadership in power to carry out the reforms accepted by it. Second, there is the need for adequate institutional arrangements and safeguards for implementation of reforms. Third, an operational plan to push ahead with the implementation of the accepted reforms."<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>. K. Hanumanthaiya (Chairman of high-powered Indian Administrative Reforms Commission of 1966), 'Implementation of Administrative Reforms,' an address at the institute of Public Administration, Lucknow. 23 November 1968, p. 7, cited in R. B. Jain, 'Innovations and Reforms in Indian Administration,' *The Indian Political Science Review*, 9, July 1975; 110.

# 3

## Administrative Reform A Conceptual Analysis

JON S. T. QUAH

This chapter addresses itself to the concept of administrative reform for two major reasons. In the first place, the research gap on administrative reform especially in the new states is a very wide one. Very little research has been done in this area. In the words of Caiden, the author of a pioneering book on the subject, "work in administrative reform is patchy in appearance and variable in quality."<sup>1</sup> Apart from the need to conduct more research on administrative reform to rectify the research gap and the contribution to knowledge that such research would make research on administrative reform is also conducted for contribution to knowledge that such research would make research on administrative reform is also conducted for practical reasons. The new states, according to Esman, are united in their desire to attain the twin goals of nation-building and socio-economic development<sup>2</sup>. One of the main findings of the United Nation's *A Handbook of Public Administration* is that "administrative improvement is the sine qua non in the implementation of programs of national development."<sup>3</sup> Administrative reform constitutes one way of improving administration, and is a means

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<sup>1</sup> G. E. Caiden, *Administrative Reform* London: The Penguin Press, 1969: 1, Shaw, in a meeting of the Southeast Asia Development Administration Group (SEADAG) at Lexington, Kentucky in February 1967, identified nineteen "researchable questions on development administration of particular interest to the Agency for International Development." Three of the nineteen topics deal specifically with administrative reform. C.K, Shaw, "Outline of Researchable Questions on Development Administration of Particular Interest to the Agency for International Development," *Research on Development Administration*, SEADAG Papers on Problems of Development in Southeast Asia, No. 15, New York : The Asia Society, 1967; 1-2.

<sup>2</sup> M. J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration," in D. Montgomery and W. J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change* New York : McGraw-Hill, 1966 60.

<sup>3</sup> H. Emmerich, *A Handbook of Public Administration Current Concepts and Practices with special reference to Developing Countries*. New York: U. N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1961 : 1.

toward development administration. Viewed in this context, research on administrative reform provides essential information to political leaders in the new states utilizing such a strategy for development.

In short, then, the concept of administrative reform is important for both theoretical and practical reasons: research on administrative reform contributes one knowledge in this area as well as provides the necessary data for those leaders in the new states that employ administrative reform as a means for national development.

Given the importance of administrative reform, what do we know about it? What does administrative reform mean? For what reasons are administrative reforms usually undertaken? In what ways are administrative reforms implemented? What are the major obstacles to administrative reform? These are the four questions that will be answered in the following sections of the chapter by reviewing the literature on the concept of administrative reform in terms of its meaning, goals, approaches and obstacles. Such a review of the literature has at least two benefits. First, it provides an inventory of what is known about administrative reform. A second and more important advantage is the identification of research gaps on administrative reform and the consequent development of research designs to rectify such gaps.

Before proceeding further, it should be noted that the four aspects of administrative reform to be dealt with do not receive equal attention. Much more emphasis has been given to the meaning of administrative reform simply because the existing definitions of the concept suffer from several weaknesses. To be more specific, the various definitions of the concept suffer from several weaknesses. To be more specific, the various definitions of administrative reform available will be critically evaluated with the aim of formulating a definition that avoids the shortcomings of the former. Similarly, the approaches to administrative reforms are also discussed in some detail, but not the analysis of the goals and obstacles to reform as these two aspects are less controversial and, as such, do not require detailed examination.

### **Meaning**

Like most other concepts in the social sciences, the concept of administrative reform means different things to different people, and there is no universally acceptable definition of it. This view is echoed by Caiden in the following way:



*The study of administrative reform is handicapped by the absence of a universally accepted definition. The indiscriminate use of the term has led to confusion and to difficulties in setting parameters for research and theorizing... The term has been applied, for instance, to all improvements in administration ...to general administrative overhauls in difficult circumstances... to specific remedies for maladministration... to any suggestion for better government... and to intentions of self-style administrative reformers...*<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, most scholars conducting research on administrative reform do not make any attempt to define the concept explicitly.<sup>5</sup> This feature is especially apparent in the various case studies on administrative reform in several countries.<sup>6</sup> More often than not, these case studies avoid the definitional route and concentrate on the administrative reforms themselves. Some of these case studies, while not defining administrative reform, refer specifically to attempts at reorganizing the administrative setup of the country concerned.<sup>7</sup>

Needless to say, it is imperative for any scholar writing on administrative reform to define what he is writing about in order to avoid confusion. It is, therefore, necessary at this juncture to consider several definitions of administrative reform beginning with Caiden's definition. Caiden has defined administrative reform as "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance."<sup>8</sup> This definition implies that 1) administrative reform is artificially stimulated by man and is not accidental, automatic or natural; 2) administrative reform is a transformatory process; and 3) resistance is a concomitant of the process of administrative reform.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>. Caiden, 43.

<sup>5</sup>. For example, F. W. Riggs, "Administrative Reform as a Problem of Dynamic Balancing," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 14, (2: April 1970: 101-135.

<sup>6</sup>. Representative examples of these are -L. K. Caldwell, "Technical Assistance and Administrative Reform in Colombia," *American Political Science Review*, 47, (2: June) 1953, 494-510; R. T. Groves, "Administrative Reform and the Politics of Reform: The Case of Venezuela," *Public Administration Review*, 27, (5: December) 1967 436-445; G. B. Siegel and K. Nascimento, "Formalism in Brazilian Administrative Reform," *International Review of Administrative Science*, 31, 3 (1965); 175-184; and R.E. Crow and A. Iskandar, "Administrative Reform in Lebanon 1958-1959," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 27, 3 (1961); 293-307.

<sup>7</sup>. See Y. Ide, \_ "Administrative Reform and Innovation: The Japanese Case", *International Social Science Journal*, 21, 1 (1969): 56-67.

<sup>8</sup>. Caiden, 1.

<sup>9</sup>. B. K. Dey, "Administrative Reform--A Perspective Analysis", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 17, (3, July-September) 1971: 560.

Caiden's definition is unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, and most importantly, his definition does not identify the purpose or goal of administrative reform. As a result of this silence on the objectives of administrative reform, one scholar has argued that Caiden's definition is one-sided and incomplete.<sup>10</sup> Put in another way, Caiden's definition does not make any attempt to answer the question: Administrative reform for what?

Secondly, Caiden's definition of administrative reform is inadequate because the phrase "administrative transformation" is vague and does not tell us very much about the content of the administrative reform. Unlike Caiden, however, other scholars have equated administrative reform with administrative reorganization. For example, Mosher has argued that:

*Students of public administration as well as majority of our educated citizenry have long associated and even identified the word reform in the administrative realm with reorganization. There is ample etymological justification for such an association, Reform has literal origins in the giving of new or different form to something; and, in treating organizational matters, new form signifies new organizational structure. Reform has a strong normative connotation: as a noun, it signifies 'change for the better;' as a verb, "to change from bad to good." Reorganization though somewhat more restricted and precise in its definition, has come to acquire nearly the same meaning in American culture, both in its descriptive and in its normative senses.<sup>11</sup>*

Mosher proceeds to say that reorganization has been utilized as a major instrument and "symbol of administrative improvement" by American students of public administration for several decades.

Even though most attempts at administrative reform take the form of reorganization, it is nevertheless inaccurate to describe all such efforts in terms of reorganization. It is probably more accurate to say that administrative reorganization constitutes *one* important procedure for

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<sup>10</sup> Ma. Concepcion T. Parroco, "A Theoretical Framework for the Study of Administrative Reform. *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 14, 3 (1970): 327. This is a review of Caiden's book.

<sup>11</sup> F. C. Mosher, "Some Notes on Reorganizations in Public Agencies," in R. C. Martin (ed.), *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays in Honor of P. H. Appleby*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1965: 129.

implementing administrative reforms.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, a Filipino scholar has distinguished between the terms "administrative reform," "reorganization" and "innovation" thus:

*The broader term "administrative reform" usually implies a crusading intent; it has a definite moralistic tone. In content, it may actually involve "reorganization" and, innovation."*<sup>13</sup>

Another and perhaps more important reason for not equating administrative reform with administrative reorganization is that the latter term is too narrow and refers to only one aspect—the *institutional* aspect of administrative reform. This aspect of administrative reform refers to the institutional or organizational changes accompanying the reform. It does not include attempts, to change the attitudes, behavior or values of administrators or other individuals involved in the reform process, i.e., the *attitudinal* aspect of administrative reform. Needless to say, both the institutional and attitudinal aspects must be considered if any discussion on administrative reform is to be complete.

The third and final reason for not accepting Caiden's definition concerns his assumption that the element of resistance accompanies the process of administrative reform. There are several problems with this assumption. In the first place, nowhere in his book does Caiden justify or provide empirical evidence for this assumption.<sup>14</sup> He simply assumes that resistance to administrative reform exists because change generates some amount of uncertainty and insecurity resulting from the implementation of the reform

It seems to me that the element of resistance need not necessarily be present in any administrative reform. This is too strict a criterion for defining administrative reform and excludes those attempts to change the administration that do not meet any resistance. All attempts to change the administration or the administrators for the better should be considered as administrative reforms, whether such attempts meet

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<sup>12</sup> For a catalogue of the different procedures for implementing administrative reforms, see W.F. Finan and A. L. Dean, "Procedures for the Preparation and Implementation of Administrative Reforms," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 23 (1957) : 437-452.

<sup>13</sup> J. V. Abueva, "Administrative Reform and Culture," in H. B. Lee and A. G. Samonte (eds.), *Administrative Reforms in Asia*. Manila, Philippines: Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration. 1970: 21, FN 1.

<sup>14</sup> Caiden elaborates on his definition of administrative reform but does not substantiate his assumption that resistance accompanies administrative reform, See Caiden, 65-68.

resistance or not. In other words, the element of resistance is not a distinguishing characteristic of administrative reform."<sup>15</sup>

Even if one accepts Caiden's assumption that resistance is a concomitant of the process of administrative reform, how does one identify or measure such resistance? How can the researcher on administrative reform operationalize this element of resistance? Furthermore, what Caiden has failed to realize is that it is not just the existence of resistance to the reform that is important but rather the source and *strength* of such resistance. The significance of resistance to administrative reform (or any other type of reform) is that if the resistance is "overwhelming" it would mean that the reform would not be implemented. Consequently, if there is resistance to a particular administrative reform, the sponsors have to identify the source of such resistance as well as its strength in order to ascertain whether the resistance can be overcome or not.<sup>16</sup>

In sum, then, Caiden's definition of administrative reform is rejected on the following three grounds: (1) it does not indicate what the goals of administrative reform are; (2) it does not provide an adequate description of the content of administrative reform; and (3) the element of resistance is not a distinguishing feature of administrative reform. The definition of administrative reform to be adopted here must not suffer from the same shortcoming if it is to be useful. However, before proceeding to define administrative reform, a few more definitions of administrative reform by other scholars will be reviewed.

Various definitions of administrative reform were offered by the participants of the seminar on "Administrative Reform and Innovations" organized by both the Government of Malaysia and the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration (EROPA) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in June 1968. In his report on the seminar, the moderator Lee said :

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<sup>15</sup>. Another related criticism of Caiden's assumption regarding resistance to administrative reform has been provided by Wyner in his review of Caiden's book, Wyner wrote: "...the very general, obstruct level at which Caiden writes allows him to speak of the appearance of administrative resistance as a uniformity... (But) To assume that a change will be resisted or accepted by the entire organization is too simplistic." See A. J. Wyner, "Change and Reform in Administrative Units," *Journal of Comparative Administration*, (2: August) 1970: 247-248."

<sup>16</sup>. Administrative reformers should be sensitive to conditions that influence receptivity, or resistance, to reform at any given time." A. G. Samonte "Patterns and Trends in Administrative Reforms "in Lee and Samonte (eds.). 296..

*...there was a genuine consensus from the very beginning of the Seminar on what we really mean by administrative reform. In this Seminar, administrative reform did not mean mere change of names and structures of some administrative organizations. Rather, it meant changing the behavior of those involved.*<sup>17</sup>

However, this is a very misleading statement because a detailed analysis of the fifteen seminar papers reveals that (1) quite a few of the authors did not define administrative reform explicitly, some stressed the institutional aspect while others focused on the attitudinal aspect; (3) some scholars, notably Abueva, combined both the institutional and attitudinal aspects in his definition of administrative reform; and (4) there were participants who defined administrative reform in such a vague manner as to include either the attitudinal or the institutional aspect depending on the focus of the author, or both aspects also. In other words, the "genuine consensus" on the meaning of administrative reform mentioned by Lee above is more apparent than real.

Of the eight participants who did not define administrative reform explicitly, six (Banerjee, Chang, Goodarzi, Hsueh, Puthuchery and Tang) focused only on the institutional aspect.<sup>18</sup> The other two participants Amara and Khosla-were more aware of the attitudinal aspects of administrative reform. In his paper, Amara placed more emphasis on the attitudinal rather than the institutional aspects. He wrote;

*This chapter seeks to complement these studies which emphasize structural reform rather than changes in administrative behavior. If we compare the administrative system with a transportation system, it may be observed that many writings on administrative reform have been just like a concentrated inquiry on the engine and design of various vehicles. In contrast, this paper is primarily concerned with the human aspect-the "drivers"*<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup>. Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, *Seminar on Administrative Reform ovations, Vol, II* Kuala Lumpur, 1968 : 3. All the six papers cap be found in Seminar, at the following pages :

<sup>18</sup>. All the six papers can be found in Seminar, at the following pages: A. M. Banerjee "Administrative Reforms in India –A Synoptic Review," 323-358; C.C Change, "Essentials for Administrative Reform and Innovations,": 342-257, M. Goodarzi, "A Brief Account of Administrative Reform in Iran," 179-197; S.S. Hsueh. :Administrative Reform in Hong Kong." 100-134; M. C. Puthuchery, "The Operations Room in Malaysia as a Technique in Administrative Reform," 277-380; and H. C. Tang, "The Administratifve Feforms of the Republic of China," 447-452.

<sup>19</sup>. A. Raksasataya, 'Preparing Administrators for National Development: Thailand's Experience," in Lee and Samonte (eds.), 200.

Khosla, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of *both* aspects of administrative reform. According to him, one of the most important lessons to be learned from the Indian experience in administrative reform was that

*Structural changes in organization will not be of much help unless the human factor in administration is suitably tackled. In formulating proposals for reforms, the effort should not be confined to improving organizations and procedures by the scientific management approach. It is equally essential to pay attention to the dynamics of group behavior.*<sup>20</sup>

Under the second category of those defining administrative reform, Cho's definition of administrative reform as "a conscious human effort to introduce changes into the behavior and performance of administrators" emphasized the attitudinal rather than the institutional aspects.<sup>21</sup> There is, however, no clear-cut example of a definition of administrative reform that stresses the institutional aspects.<sup>22</sup> Abueva was the only seminar participant who combined both the institutional and attitudinal aspects in his definition of administrative reform. He viewed administrative reform as "essentially a deliberate attempt to use power authority and influence to change the goals, structure or procedures of the bureaucracy, and therefore, to alter the behavior of its personnel."<sup>23</sup> Finally, three participants-Lee, Samonte, and Siagian-provided very vague definitions of administrative reform which could include either or both the institutional and attitudinal aspects.<sup>24</sup>

Of all the definitions considered above, Abueva's definition appears to be the most useful because he focuses on both the attitudinal and institutional aspects of administrative reform. The only weakness of his definition is that the goals of administrative reform are not identified.<sup>25</sup> In other words, the definition of administrative reform to be adopted here must indicate what the goals of administrative reform are and combine both the institutional and attitudinal aspects of reform.

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<sup>20</sup> J. N. Khosla, "Administrative Reform in India : Perspective and Lessons," in Lee and Samonte Peds, 282.

<sup>21</sup> S. C. Cho, "Two Reforms Under the Military Regime in Korea : A Comparative Analysis," in Lee and Samonte (eds.), 125.

<sup>22</sup> An example of this is Finan and Dean's definition which is not included in the EROPA Seminar. See Finan and Dean, 437.

<sup>23</sup> Abueva, 22.

<sup>24</sup> Lee and Samonte (eds.), 7, 96, 288.

<sup>25</sup> Abueva does not identify the goals of administrative reform in his definition but he does so in another section of his paper, See Abueva, 25-26.

## Goals

What are the goals of administrative reform? For what reasons are administrative reforms usually carried out? These are important questions to ask and answer because

*If we desire societies to be well administered; if, furthermore, we realize it is merely question-begging to urge greater administrative efficiency; and if, finally, we know we cannot reasonably speak of administrative reforms without defining the goals we wish to realize, we cannot evade the attempt to define the ideas to be sustained by the machinery of the state.*<sup>26</sup>

Furthermore, according to Dror, "clarification of the overall goals of an administrative reform is a fundamental requisite for success."<sup>27</sup>

Similarly, Leemans has argued that "the degree to which objectives are attained is a principal yardstick in judging the success or failure of administrative reform programs."<sup>28</sup> In short, administrative reform can only succeed if its goals are clearly stated at the outset; and, in turn, the evaluation of the reform is based on the degree of goal attainment. Thus, for all the above reasons it is necessary to identify the major goals of administrative reform.

In his seminar paper, "The Objectives of Governmental Reorganization," Dimock said that the primary aim of reorganization was "to make programs more effective in terms of accomplishing group goals."<sup>29</sup> Put differently, the major goal of reorganization is to increase the level of organizational effectiveness. In the same vein, Finan and Dean have contended :

*The central objective of administrative reform is to develop and put into effect whatever changes are required to enable the administrative organs of a government to execute public policies in an effective and responsible manner.*<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> H. S. Karial, "Goals for Administrative Reform in Developing States: An Open-Ended Design," in' R. Braibanti (eds.), *Political and Administrative Development*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1969; 150.

<sup>27</sup> Y. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reforms," *Development and Change*, 2, (2:1970-71). 22.

<sup>28</sup> A.F. Leemans, "Administrative Reform: An Overview", *Development and Change*, 2, (2: 197071): 10.

<sup>29</sup> M. E, Dimock, "The Objectives of Governmental Reorganization," *Public Administration Review*, 11, (4: Autumn) 1951:234.

<sup>30</sup> Finan and Dean, 438.

It should be noted here that this objective of improving administrative effectiveness is related to the more general objective of attaining national development goals because administrative reform is one of the primary measures employed by governments in the developing countries to achieve development goals.<sup>31</sup>

Apart from the above goal of administrative reform there are three other objectives which have been classified by Mosher as follows (1) those goals related to the changing of operating policies and programs and which include expansion of scope and extent of programs shifts in program emphasis, and shifts in loci of power; (2) those goals concerned with problems of personnel, individuals or groups; and (3) those goals intended to counter or respond to pressures and threats from outside the organization.<sup>32</sup>

One final point remains to be made regarding the goals of administrative reform. Abueva has distinguished between manifest or declared goals and undisclosed or undeclared goals of administrative reform. Examples of manifest goals are efficiency, economy, effectiveness, political responsibility, improved service, streamlined organization and procedures, coordination, unified direction, and indigenization or ethnic representation. Undeclared goals of administrative reform are usually not disclosed to the public because of ideology and expediency; and the most common undisclosed objective appears to be political control of policy and personnel.<sup>33</sup>

Bearing the above points in mind, I can now proceed to define administrative reform. For the purposes of this analysis, *administrative reform is defined as a deliberate attempt to change both (a) the structure and procedures of the public bureaucracy (i.e., reorganization or the institutional aspect) and (b) the attitudes and behavior of the public bureaucrats involved (i.e. the attitudinal aspect), in order to promote organizational effectiveness and attain national development goals.* It should be noted here that this definition applies only to those organizations that are committed to the achievement of the goals of national development i.e., private or non-governmental organizations. This definition is applicable to private or nongovernmental organizations only to the extent that such organizations are involved in the realization of such development objectives.

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<sup>31</sup> C. P. Ramos, "Foreword." in Lee and Samonte (eds.), 7.

<sup>32</sup> Mosher, 137-139.

<sup>33</sup> Abueva, 25.



## Approaches

I have so far dealt with two aspects of the concept of administrative reform: its meaning and the reasons for which it is usually undertaken. The focus is now on the third aspect-approaches to administrative reform or the various ways in which such reform is carried out.

In his book Caiden devotes a chapter to "Perspectives of Administrative Reform" in which he identifies five different national approaches to administrative reform among the developed nations viz: the French, Prussian, Bolshevik or Russian, British and American approaches. Caiden's analysis of these approaches is not very systematic as the items he has employed to describe such approaches are not comparable except for the following four aspects : whether the reformers are outsiders or part of the system, how reform is imposed (from above or below), the influence of ideology on reform, and whether reform followed revolution or not.<sup>34</sup> Not surprisingly, his comments regarding these approaches are very general. However, his first two observations are important and should be noted:

1. Administrative reform is related to the specific cultural environment. No single approach is correct or better than any other.
2. Culture-bound approaches may not be exportable if they are, only to countries sharing general cultural features.<sup>35</sup>

Turning his attention to the newly independent states, Caiden observes that the "fact of independence alone makes administrative reform imperative" because such countries have to establish their own indigenous administration and to find immediate solutions to a whole host of administrative problems. Caiden argues that administrative reform is required to solve all these problems and the approach to be adopted would depend on the following factors: the nature of the local culture, the importance of tradition, the caliber of the new leadership, the type of political regime in power, the strength and diversity of internal and external opponents, and the availability and mobility of resources.<sup>36</sup>

What are the different approaches to administrative reform undertaken by the new states? Caiden has classified such approaches into four categories: (1) those countries which do not subscribe to

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<sup>34</sup> Caiden, 90-96.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 96-97.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 99-100.

administrative reform and are committed to the status quo; (2) those countries with a "purely pragmatic approach" to administrative reform, i.e. reforms are improvised when the need arises and there is no formal or institutional set-up for implementing administrative reforms; (3) those countries which are deeply committed to administrative reform as a technique of solving their administrative problems and are equipped with "established formal machinery for the initiation and evaluation of reforms;" and (4) those countries which have experienced reform imposed from the outside.<sup>37</sup>

This is not a very useful classification for three reasons. First, it is a confused classification because the first three categories are based on the criterion of degree of commitment on the part of the countries to administrative reform, while the fourth category is based on the criterion of source of the reform: either internal or external. In other words, the criteria used by Caiden in his classification are of different dimensions.<sup>38</sup> Secondly, the last three categories are not mutually exclusive because the source of the reforms in the second and third categories need not necessarily be internal only; reforms from the outside can also be improvised when the occasion demands or be established on a more formal basis. Finally, no specific examples have been provided by Caiden to illustrate his four categories.

In his paper, "Administrative Reform as a Problem of Dynamic Balancing," which was first read at the Round Table on Administrative Reform and Development held in Beirut, Lebanon, on April 11-18, 1970, Riggs makes two very important points with regard to administrative reform. First, he argues that the effectiveness of an organization depends on two factors: its ability to solve problems as well as the "weight of the problems it is called on to solve."<sup>39</sup> In short, Riggs is saying that there are two methods of improving administrative performance: either by improving the capabilities of the organization, or by reducing "the burdens it has to bear." The latter method has not been emphasized by administrative reformers at all; instead, most reform efforts have focused on strategies for enhancing the capacities of organizations such as government agencies. Using an analogy, Riggs says that "the food problem can be tackled by reducing the number of mouths to be fed as well as by increasing the supply of

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid. 100-101.

<sup>38</sup> See A. L. Kalleberg, "The Logic of Comparison A Methodological Note on the Comparative Study of Political Systems," **World Politics**, 19, (1 October) 1966: 73-74.

<sup>39</sup> Riggs, 129.

food." The same lesson has to be learned in administrative reform for "administrative capacities can be enhanced by reducing the number of problems to be solved by government as well as by strengthening the capacity of government to solve problems."<sup>40</sup>

The second point to note is Riggs's answer to the question, "How shall we proceed to strive for administrative reform in any given country?" He answers this question by referring to a medical analogy. The treatment of any particular case of diabetes depends on (1) a general understanding of the dynamics of the diseases and (2) an accurate knowledge of the patient's condition. In administrative reform, however, treatment depends on the latter rather than the former because there is no general theoretical framework for analyzing administrative reform, and, accordingly, "We must try to determine what each country, at each stage of its own development, needs to do in order to advance."<sup>41</sup> An additional requirement is that the reforms must be made by reformers and leaders within the country concerned and not by outsiders or foreigners.

One final point to note about the various strategies to administrative reform is that they vary in scope from the most comprehensive to the extremely narrow. The focus of the comprehensive strategy is on the entire administrative machinery of government as a whole and not on specific agencies, procedures or routines. In other words, changes or innovations are introduced into the public bureaucracy on a government-wide basis and not on a piecemeal basis. This means that if comprehensive administrative reform is to be attempted serious consideration must be given to such factors as the timing of the reform, its terms of reference as well as the personnel and financial resources required for such an effort.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, comprehensive administrative reform is only carried out periodically.

How useful is the comprehensive strategy? According to the Public Administration Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, the comprehensive approach to administrative reform is not very useful in the case of the developing countries because "comprehensive reform efforts are said to cause trouble by trying to do too much too soon."<sup>43</sup> Most of these countries

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 129-130.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 131-132.

<sup>42</sup> Public Administration Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, "Administrative Improvement for National Development: Some Major Issues and Approaches," *International Social Development Review*, 2, New York: United Nations, 1970: 42.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

still lack the necessary skills and resources for initiating comprehensive administrative reforms. Another shortcoming of the comprehensive strategy is that its comprehensiveness is relative in the sense that even the most comprehensive reform deals only with a few facets of administrative reality: it must get support from other reforms.”<sup>44</sup>

It has been seen that the comprehensive approach to administrative reform per se is not suited to the needs of most developing countries. The alternative that is left is the incremental strategy or "islands of excellence" approach.<sup>45</sup> Unlike the comprehensive approach, the incremental strategy views administrative reform in more specific terms. Reform is usually carried out on a piecemeal basis. In other words, "an administrative reform is always a single step which, in isolation, might be 'only a minor departure but which, in connection with a chain of subsequent steps', leads to innovation.”<sup>46</sup>

The incremental approach is superior to the comprehensive strategy on two counts. First, the former is a gradual approach and encourages experimentation and increases the confidence of the reformers because it enables them to make the necessary adjustments if the proposed changes are not wholly satisfactory. This is possible only when reforms are introduced on an incremental basis as no drastic changes are involved. A second advantage of the incremental strategy is its limited scope which ensures that there is usually less outside interference when the reform is being initiated.<sup>47</sup>

However, the incremental approach cannot survive on its own for long without any support from the political leadership. Unlike the comprehensive strategy which "is better suited to catch the imagination of top political leadership," the incremental approach is usually not supported by the political leaders because of its limited objectives. It follows, then, that an incremental administrative reform has to broaden its scope in order to receive the political support it requires for its survival. Conversely, a comprehensive administrative reform has to reduce its scope by focusing on specific aspects if it is to be

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<sup>44</sup> H. B. Lee, "The Concept, Structure and Strategy of Administrative Reform: An Introduction," in Lee and Samonte (eds.), 16.

<sup>45</sup> For more details, see C. Thurber, *Islands of Development: A Political and Social Approach to Development Administration in Latin America*. Bloomington, Indiana: American Society for Public Administration, Comparative Administration Group, 1966.

<sup>46</sup> Lee, 17.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

successfully implemented. In short, both the comprehensive and incremental strategies to administrative reform are not contradictory or mutually exclusive. Rather, these two approaches supplement one another. Lee refers to the interdependence of these two strategies as a “dialectical continuum of reform strategy.”<sup>48</sup>

Bearing the complementarity of the two approaches in mind, the question that arises is: Under what conditions should each of the two strategies be employed? There is no simple and clear-cut answer to this question. However, some clues are provided by Lee's "matrix of optimum reform strategy," which is essentially a 2x2 table constructed by juxtaposing the variables of time and leadership. The result is the following figure.

Figure-1: A Matrix of Optimum Reform Strategy<sup>49</sup>

		TIME	
		Favorable	Unfavorable
LEADERSHIP	Favorable	Comprehensive Strategy	Incremental Strategy (B)
	Unfavorable	Incremental Strategy (A)	No Strategy

Briefly, the comprehensive approach should be used when the timing is suitable and the leadership is competent and promotes the implementation of the reform. On the other hand, when both the timing and leadership are not favorable, the country concerned is not adequately prepared for administrative reform yet and therefore no strategy is recommended. In between these two extremes, the incremental approach is advocated incremental strategy (A) is being used when the timing is favorable but not the leadership; while incremental strategy (B) is employed when the conditions are reversed, i.e, the leadership favors reform but the timing is not ripe.<sup>50</sup>

The timing and leadership are only two variables to be considered when implementing comprehensive administrative reform. A third variable, "risk acceptability" i.e., the degree of risk involved in initiating and implementing the administrative reform, must also be taken into account.<sup>51</sup> Since administrative reform involves both institutional and attitudinal changes which might not be accepted by those affected by the reform, the political leaders must assess very carefully the risks involved in undertaking the reform on one hand, and

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Figure 1 is reproduced from *ibid.* 18.

<sup>50</sup> For more details about the matrix, see *ibid.* 18-19.

<sup>51</sup> Dror, 27-28.

weigh these risks against the risks in maintaining the status quo on the other hand.

For example, the degree of risk in implementing the reform will be high if the public bureaucracy is opposed to the reform for say, reasons of its own vested interests. The government leaders, on the other hand, might be anxious to push through the reform in order to curb the power of these bureaucrats. In this case, the political leadership has to consider very carefully whether it is strong enough to meet the opposition from the civil servants if the reform is imposed; and whether, in the absence of reform, it will be replaced by the bureaucrats. Reform will only be undertaken by the political leadership "if the risk involved in continuing the existing situation is large, or if considerable gains may be expected."<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the degree of risk involved in undertaking reform is directly related to the scope of the reform effort— the broader the reform, the higher will be the risk incurred. Thus, a comprehensive reform strategy will incur a higher degree of risk than an incremental reform strategy.

In sum, the comprehensive strategy is employed in administrative reform when all three variables— timing, leadership and risk acceptability— are favorable. Conversely, the incremental approach is relied upon when some of these variables are unfavorable.

So far, I have examined the concept of administrative reform in terms of its definition, its rationale, and its strategies. It only remains for me to identify the various obstacles to administrative reform before concluding this paper.

### **Obstacles**

Caiden has identified seven "outstanding universal obstacles" to administrative reform namely: geography, history, technology, culture, economy, society and polity.<sup>53</sup> Geography is an impediment in the sense that the physical location, size of topography of a country might not be conducive to administrative reform. History is often employed as a reference point by both advocates and opponents of reform alike to substantiate their respective cases. It is an obstacle in so far as a country's attempt to promote administrative reform is constrained by its previous record in this area.

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<sup>52</sup> Leemans, p. 8.

<sup>53</sup> The following discussion is a summary, of the major points of Caiden's Chapter 6, "Obstacles to Administrative Reform." For a more detailed account, see Caiden, 166-183.

A third obstacle to administrative reform is the level of technology in a country. A country that is not technologically advanced will encounter more problems in administrative reform than another with a higher level of technology because in the case of the former, there is less pressure to provide administrative solution for "complex social and administrative problems."

Apart from geography, history and technology, certain cultural features of a society especially language, religion, race, kinship ties and other primordial attachments could prove obstructive to reform. For example, linguistic diversity gives rise to problems in communication among the population, while most religions tend to favor the status quo. Nationalism, local etiquette and values, and national complacency are other cultural hindrances to bureaucratic reform.

Fifth, the economy could pose obstacles to reform if there is scarcity of both financial resources and trained personnel. Scarcity of resources (both financial and non-financial) constitutes the most important economic obstacle to reform because reform requires a substantial investment of time, effort, and resources for its implementation. Apart from that lack of capital scarcity of trained personnel also poses a serious handicap to the planning and implementation of administrative reform.

Finally, both society in general and the polity in particular can hinder administrative reform efforts. Society itself could be an obstacle to reform insofar as it is inclined toward preservation of the status quo and insofar as an attitude of indifference to administration prevails among the general population. The polity is a very important factor influencing the outcome of administrative reform because "the extent to which reformers are successful depends on astute political tactics and manipulation of political forces within the society."<sup>54</sup>

Three important points need to be stressed with regard to the above checklist of obstacles to administrative reform. In the first place, there is some degree of overlap among the various obstacles especially among the cultural and social obstacles on one hand, and the economic and political impediments on the other. Secondly, the aforementioned obstacles seem to be more serious in the developing countries than in the developed ones. Thirdly, of all the above obstacles, the political factor appears to be the most significant one.

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 181.

The importance of the political factor in the implementation of administrative reforms can be seen by referring to a few case studies on administrative reform. In the case of India for example, Khosla had argued that:

*Administrative reforms can be implemented effectively only if they have a high-level political support and enlightened public opinion behind them. It is no less necessary to win the cooperation of the bureaucracy but on issues where the bureaucracy has a stake in maintaining the status quo, high-level political intervention is necessary to give effect to the reforms.*<sup>55</sup>

A second example is provided by Hong Kong where, according to Hsueh, attempts at administrative reform are being hindered by three political factors the country's colonial status, public indifference to politics, and political uncertainty.<sup>56</sup> Perhaps, the best statement on the importance of the political factor in administrative reform is that made by Samonte who wrote

*...the success of administrative reforms in effecting improvements in public administration depends to a large extent on simultaneous changes in the political system. ...Administrative reform thrives best in an environment of good politics. In developing countries, improved politics means political modernization—a positive change in political values and attitudes, increased participation (both quantitatively and qualitatively) of various sectors and groups in the political process. It must be recognized, however, that administrative reforms must be suited to particular conditions and needs that characterize a country's state of political development at a given period.*<sup>57</sup>

## Conclusion

The literature on the concept of administrative reform has been reviewed in the preceding four sections of the chapter in terms of four foci: meaning, goals, approaches and obstacles. The above review of the literature is interactive in so far as it helps us to make an inventory of what is known about administrative reform and to identify the various research gaps in this area.

As far as the first benefit is concerned, our review of the literature reveals that there is no consensus among scholars of public

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<sup>55</sup> Khosla, 283.

<sup>56</sup> S. S. Hsueh, "Ecology and Administrative Reform in Hong Kong," in Lee and Samonte (eds..) 242-243.

<sup>57</sup> Samonte, 299.



administration concerning the meaning of administrative reform. To be more specific, existing definitions of administrative reform are not perfect and suffer from two major shortcomings: (1) the non-identification of the goals of administrative reform; and (2) emphasis on either the institutional or attitudinal aspects of reform, but not on both aspects. Accordingly, a definition of administrative reform which attempts to avoid these weaknesses has been provided by the author. This definition of administrative reform is offered as a tentative one and I hope that it will be useful to those scholars interested in conducting empirical research on administrative reform in the new states of Asia and Africa because of its focus on both the institutional and attitudinal aspects of administrative reform.

There is less controversy regarding the goals, approaches and obstacles to administrative reform. The major goal of administrative reform is to improve the level of organizational effectiveness of the organization or organizations concerned. Associated with this goal of improving organizational effectiveness are other goals which are either declared or undisclosed by the government or groups associated with the reform efforts. With regard to the approaches to administrative reform, it can be seen that a combination of both the comprehensive and incremental strategies has been employed by those new states which rely on administrative reform as one of the means toward the attainment of national development goals. But, the relative weight placed on each strategy depends on three major factors : the attitude of the political leadership toward the reform effort, the timing of the reform, and the degree of risk acceptability as perceived by the political leadership. Finally, there is a whole host of cultural, social, economic and political obstacles which hinder the process of administrative reform especially in the Afro-Asian countries.

The major and perhaps also the most important research gap revealed by the above review of the literature is the absence of any comparative study on administrative reform in several countries. Research on administrative reform, takes the form of general theoretical analyses and specific case studies of administrative reform in various countries.<sup>58</sup> In other words, the existing state of knowledge on

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<sup>58</sup> For other examples of general theoretical analysis of administrative reform, see A. R. Cohen, "The Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform Towards More Differentiated Strategies for Change." *Development and*

administrative reform in the developing countries is essentially idiographic rather than nomothetic knowledge. In order to formulate universal generalizations on the process of administrative reform in the new states, more comparative studies on administrative reform must be conducted.

How should scholars of public administration undertake such comparative studies on administrative studies on administrative reform? What variables should they focus on in their comparison of the process of administrative reform in different countries? No final answers can be provided at this stage to these questions, but it seems to me that researchers embarking on cross-national studies on administrative reform can initiate their comparisons of the different nations' experiences in this area by concentrating on the following variables:

1. The *content* of the administrative reform, that is, both the institutional and attitudinal aspects.
2. The *goals* of the administrative reform regardless of whether such goals have been announced or undisclosed by the political leadership.
3. The *approach* selected by the political leadership toward administrative reform especially the relative weight given to both the comprehensive strategies.

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*Change*, 2, (2: 1970-71) : 65-82 ; H. B. Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform," *Development and Change*, 2, (2 : 1970-71) :52-64; and M. Weiss, "Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Government Reorganization," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 11, (1 : January) 1967:58-71. For other case studies of administrative reform, see K. Ankomah, "Reflections on Administrative Reform in Ghana," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*. 36 (1970) : 299-303; R. B. de Guzman, "Administrative Reform in the Philippines : An Overview," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, 12, (4 : 1968) : 395-412 ; V. V. Moharir, "Administrative Reform in India," *Development and Change*, 2, (2 : 1970-71) : 83-97 ; B. Siegel, "The Strategy of Public Administration Reform : The Case of Brazil," *Public Administration Review*, 26, (1 : March) 1966 : 45-55 ; G. E. Caiden, "Prospects for Administrative Reform in Israel," *Public Administration*, 4, (Spring : 1968) : 25-43 ; and M. J. Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia : Institution Building and Reform in a Plural Society* (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1972. Examples of works which combine both theoretical aspects and case studies are: F. C. Mosher (eds.), *Government Reorganization: Cases and Commentary*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967; and J.V. Abueva (ed.), *Perspectives in Government Reorganization*. Manila : College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1969.

4. The nature of the *environment* in which the administrative reform is being implemented, i.e., whether the environment favors reform or whether the reform effort is being hindered by the existence of various obstacles.
5. The attitude of *political leadership* toward administrative reform, i.e., whether it provides or withholds its sponsorship and support of the reform effort. This variable is perhaps the most crucial one because it is the political leadership of a country which first decides on whether there is any need for administrative reform, and if so, what are the goals, contents and approaches to administrative reform. The political leaders also assess the extent to which the various environmental influences hinder or promote administrative reform.

The above list of five variables constitutes one way of approaching the comparative study of administrative reform in the new states. It is by no means the only method, nor are the five aspects mentioned exhaustive. At best, what is offered here is a tentative research strategy which needs to be refined and modified by actual empirical research.



# 4

## Administrative Reform

Krishna Kumar Tummala

Modern state is an administrative state. Gone are the days when state activity was limited primarily to the performance of what Lassalle called "the night watchman's duty". With the proliferation of the concept of the welfare state, the state has metamorphosed into a service state. The services it renders are so many that it is said to be taking care of the individual "from the womb to the tomb". In fact, there is not a field of individual's life which is not, directly or indirectly, touched by the long arm of the state. The great expansion of public enterprise enhances the same. There has been, in fact, such a tremendous increase in the administrative activity and its importance that it is feared to have become uncontrollable. That the society is largely bureaucratized and the executive power is ever on the increase are evident everywhere. This fear led Lord Hewart to write a book on the subject as early as in 1929 and call it the *New Despotism*, and C. K. Allen saw it fit to name his book, in 1931, *Bureaucracy Triumphant*.

The essence of any government can be summarized under two major headings: deciding on the general policies that govern the community concerned and the development and execution of detailed programs to realize the given policies. The traditional policy administration dichotomy viewed the first, policy-making, as the domain of the elected politician and the second, execution of that policy, as the purpose of administration.<sup>1</sup> Administration, or the civil

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, the oft-repeated statement of W. Wilson "... Administration lies outside the proper sphere of Politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its officers." W. Wilson, "The Study of Administration," *Political Science Quarterly*, (2 June) 1887, 210. (Emphasis in the original) But in fairness to Wilson it must be stated that there indeed are doubts if he really dichotomized thus. In the same essay, in the opening paragraph, he also states that the first object of administrative study is to discover "what government can properly and successfully do". This appears to be the central concern of politics, but is given as an object of

service, often called also (sometimes even pejoratively) as the bureaucracy, consists of the enormous apparatus below the political level, manning the various positions in the field, more or less permanently, picked for their education, expert knowledge and experience, and charged with the responsibility of applying the policies to concrete situations from day to day. Such a neat compartmentalization of policy making and execution has long been abandoned.<sup>2</sup> However that may be, it is unmistakably clear that the civil servant plays a great part in rendering advice at the time of policy-making, and later executes the same. The execution of laws in itself provides two more opportunities both of which imply good deal of leeway to the civil servant: ascertaining the facts of the particular situation and relating them to the established policy.

Efficient administration is the sine qua non of a service state. Brought up in an atmosphere of routinizing policy and caught up in a concrete situation in the field, the civil servant may find himself inflexible and even ambivalent when confronted with the incompatibility between the general and the particular. His policy commitment may dictate one thing and the practical situation may demand another, in which case the easiest way of escape is to fall back upon routine. That the civil servant can be the bastion of conservatism in a post-revolutionary situation, despite the revolutionary ideology of the leaders, was well brought out by Alexis de Tocqueville and Sorel in their analysis of the post French revolutionary times. The very need to adjust to the concrete situation may tend to make the civil servant pragmatic and anti-ideological. This conservatism of the civil servant becomes more of a problem in an underdeveloped or developing country where, to use Gawthrop's concept, the civil servant might

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administration. See the editorial comments on this in D. Waldo, Ed., *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953: 64-65.

<sup>2</sup> Although the debate may continue, the indisputable role of the administrator in policy-making has been well established. See, for example, a statement: "We will not understand public administration until we understand administration as a political process.... We must begin with the proposition that the administrative acts of government are policy outputs." P. E. Arnold, "Reorganization and Politics: A Reflection on the Adequacy of Administrative Theory," *Public Administration Review* (PAR), 34 (3, May-June) 1974 : 210.

logically be viewed as a "change agent".<sup>3</sup> Thus, the cardinal question may be one of overcoming bureaucratic conservatism and including the civil servant to take care of the present and innovate for the future.

The points for consideration are: a. Does the law permit the civil servant to act? b. Are the social and political considerations favorable? c. Does he have the necessary means and skills? and d. Can he, or should he, attempt to alter conditions further as a supplement, to or substitute for regular political action?

Leninist strategy of destroying the present completely and rebuilding anew according to an ideological blue-print is one way of answering these questions. Mao's cultural revolution as an attempt at imbuing a whole new set of cultural values may be another. For those who are committed to the Anglo-American democratic values, the above two strategies may not be acceptable. One alternative is reform-administrative reform.

### **Reform and Reorganization**

Administrative reform is defined by Caiden as "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation, against resistance".<sup>4</sup> It is necessary that reform is further defined and distinguished from reorganization and change. Any reorganization, according to Mansfield,

*contemplates change of some sort in an ongoing activity, and with it, ordinarily, some transfer of control. To secure a desired change it may be enough to issue an order or make a persuasive suggestion; to display a carrot or stick to the people already in place... Reorganization... presumes that these remedies may accompany or follow, but are not available or will not suffice to start the process of change. Instead it decrees a change in organizational structure or jurisdiction as a beginning and*

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<sup>3</sup> "Change agents ...are committed to the premise that political development is a direct consequence of an increase in the problem solving ability of the individual situated in the external environment." L.C. Gawthrop, *Administrative Politics and Social Change*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971: 99. Whether in fact he is actually viewed and treated as a change agent is an altogether different question.

<sup>4</sup> G. E. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*. Chicago : Aldine, 1969: 65.

*counts on this (and the shadow its prospect casts ahead) to alter the function in the desired direction or manner....*<sup>5</sup>

All reforms are changes, but not all changes are reforms. Changes may be negative, reactionary. Reform in our sense is inescapably normative in that we wish to move from a negative to a positive situation to deal with a grievance in Burke's sense.<sup>6</sup> Reform has progress for its objective, as it aims at effecting, for example; (a) efficiency and economy in administration; (b) wider distribution of public services; (c) vitality and effectiveness of the orders of government; (d) intelligent and equitable adaptation to changing n of the society; and so on. Reform does not do violence to the present or even to the tradition because it embodies conscious and peaceful change with a normative meaning. It may be in pursuance of the concept of justice or may be to reclaim the animating cripples, as Jefferson called them that might be lost in the gradual attrition of equality. It is more than reorganization in that it covers a larger canvas and in contrast with narrower management objectives, has larger underlying social goals and basic priorities.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> H. C. Mansfield, "The Federal Executive Reorganization: Thirty Years of Experience," *PAR* 29 (4: July-August) 1969: 333.

<sup>6</sup> E. Burke in his letter to a Noble Lord makes an important distinction between change and reform. While change alters the substance of the objects, reform is a direct application of a remedy to the grievance complained. Change is novelty, while reform begins with the present social order. The new good must be developed from the old. Leaving aside the purely speculative, he advocates that man should be considered in his life situation in specific historical milieu. He lays down great stress on the use of the "cumulative experience" of the past and defends tradition. In his *Speech on the Representation of Commons in Parliament*, he poses an important question: "This is the true touch-stone of all theories which regard man and affairs of men. Does it suit his nature *in general*? Does it suit his nature as modified by his habits?" E. Burke, *The Works of Right Honorable Edmund Burke*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1904: 97.

<sup>7</sup> For example, Mosher classified four principal goals of reorganization: 1. those having to do with changing policy *and programs*; 2. those intended to improve *administrative effectiveness*; 3. those directed specifically to *problems of personnel*; and 4. those intended to counter or respond to *pressures and threats* from outside the organization. F.C. Mosher, ed. *Governmental Reorganization: Cases and Commentaries*. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967 : 197. (Emphasis in the original)

It is of interest to see what Downs has to say in this context. While explaining the reasons for performance gap, he observes : No bureau will alter its behavior pattern unless someone believes that significant



## Developed, Developing and Transitional Stages

The hypothesis that the reform methods and goals set in a developing country are different from those in a developed country, with the consequent difference in the roles of respective bureaucracies, makes it necessary to distinguish the characteristics that differentiate a developed country from a developing country. It should be remembered that the development scheme has no precise boundaries. Developed countries have traditional elements and the development process is one that never comes to a halt. We should also recognize that theories of development in the Anglo-American societies have a decided bias in favor of modernity and participatory democracy.

While not necessarily insisting that every country has to go through a given set of stages of development<sup>8</sup> for, after all, the stages model heavily relies on the experience of only certain countries and usually takes the modern democratic state as its ideal, and sometimes the stages may be blurred and at times some countries may even skip some stages-I propose to follow the stages model, with some modifications. Development is viewed as a continuing process. As Galbraith suggests, it is a line along which the various nations of the world are spaced.<sup>9</sup>

Though all writers agree that a traditional society has to go through a state of transition before reaching modernity, there is no consensus on a theory of the stages as such. In the journey from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, the traditional state is important. The transitional society is still rural, but is in the process of developing institutions and processes to involve the masses in the political system. There is not only a change in the attitude of the government, but also in the policies

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discrepancy exists between what it is doing and what it 'ought' to be doing". A. Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1967, See Chapter XVI, especially p. 191. For a good discussion of the distinction between reforms, change, and revolution, see Caiden, 67-70.

<sup>8</sup> Two good examples of the stages model are A.F.K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963 and W.W. Rostow, *Politics and the Stages of Growth*. Cambridge University Press, 1971.

<sup>9</sup> Galbraith argues that such a conceptual treatment would enhance clarity in the perception of both the process and policy of development. It also avoids the psychologically damaging stigma grouping nations as donors and recipients when studying assistance. Aid becomes a cooperative effort in that each country has to gain something from those that are ahead of it. J.K. Galbraith, *Economic Development*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964:46-52.

and functions of the government. The state is no longer merely interested in regulation and provision of minimum services, but actually changes into a service state. The economy is reaching the early stages of industrialization and the political system also change *pari passu*. There will be structural differentiation and functional specialization.

The problem of change may appear in general to be an administrative problem. Such a view would lead to linear thinking, as Riggs observed.<sup>10</sup> This would be disastrous as we identify a cause, eliminate it, and expect the bad consequences to disappear. This is not so. During the transitional stage a comprehensive change is occurring and any reform attempt should address itself to a compendium the legislator, the civil servant, the judiciary, the people at large, the manager of state enterprises, etc. The whole canvas of the society should be kept in view and in balance. Otherwise, as long suggests, "attempts to solve administrative problems in isolation from the structure of power and purpose in the polity are found to be illusory".<sup>11</sup>

In the modern stage, there is a pronounced movement towards a centrally administered economy. Political institutions and processes are developed to encourage participation in national endeavors. Here not only the political system is undergoing a transformation, but its sub-systems are also subject to a similar process. Following this tendency four factors may be presented along a continuum traditional and developed : Science, Economics, Bureaucracy, and Political Participation.<sup>12</sup> (See Figure 1)

The crucial question then is how to carry on administrative reform and facilitate transition. This may 'take place either on an ideological

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<sup>10</sup> F. W. Riggs, *Administrative Reform and Political Responsiveness: A Theory of Dynamic Balancing*, Comparative Politics Series, No. 01-010, Vol. I. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1970 : 567. In contrast, he proposed a theory of dynamic balancing by identifying seven key balances that should be kept in view. They are: (1) The chief executive in relation to policy; (2) the bureaucracy in relation to its context; (3) the party system, (4) the set of institutions surrounding the elected assembly; (5) the elected assembly itself; (6) the bureaucracy itself; and (7) the citizen body as it relates to government.

<sup>11</sup> D.N. Long, "Power and Administration," PAR, 9, (4, autumn) 1949:264.

<sup>12</sup> See F.W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*. Boston : Houghton Mifflin. 1964, and G. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture*. Boston : Little, Brown & Co. 1965.

or on an incremental basis. (These two approaches are further explained below) That the "contents of men's minds"-their beliefs, are crucial to politico-economic development, was stressed by Spengler.<sup>13</sup> I believe that an analysis of the prevailing ideology in the country would provide access to the beliefs of men charged with the responsibility of ushering in change and the social policies that emerge from such a belief system.<sup>14</sup>

### **Relevance of Ideology**

The term ideology, used as an epithet, has caused a lot of confusion and controversy. I am in sympathy with the views of La Palombara who, acknowledging Garstin's definition-, used the term as involving "a philosophy of history, man's present place in it, some estimate of probable lines of future development and a set of prescriptions regarding how to hasten, retard, and/or modify that developmental direction".<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values, and Politico-Economic Development", in *Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development*. R. Braibanti and J. Spengler, eds., Durham: Duke University Press, 1961: 1-56.

<sup>14</sup> One good study that examined the beliefs of politicians is by R. D. Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians; Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy*. New Haven, Con.: Yale University Press, 1973. The term "ideology" is used in that study to refer to a certain style of political analysis.

<sup>15</sup> J. La Palombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and Interpretation", *American Political Science Review (APSR)*, 60, (1 March) 1966: 7; K. Mannheim, after an excellent study and discussion of the term, makes a distinction between "particular" and "total" formulations of ideology. The analysis of the former is purely at a psychological and individual level. It is primarily a psychology of interest. The latter, with which we are concerned, is a functional analysis "confining itself to an objective description of the structural difference in minds operating in different social settings", and "presupposes simply that there is a correspondence between a given social situation and a given perspective, point of view, or apperception mass". See his *Ideology and Utopia*, New York: Harcourt, Brace World, 1936, Chapter II.

For a survey of the uses of the word "ideology" and elucidation of the different senses of ideology, see J. Plamenatz, *Ideology*. New York Praeger, 1970.

For confusion in the meaning of the word and the problems that it causes in empirical research, see D. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior", *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 5, (4, November) 1961: 317-331.

Figure-I : The Transitional |Model of Development

	<b>Traditional</b>	<b>Developing (Transitional)</b>	<b>Developed</b>
<b>SCIENCE</b>	Lacking in scientific consciousness	Scientific consciousness is a preserve of the elites	Scientific consciousness permeates most strata of society and linked to military and economic system
<b>ECONOMICS</b>	Production only for consumption	Importance of savings and investments begins to be appreciated	Savings and investments extensively elaborate and related to technology and planned development
<b>BUREAUCRACY</b>	“Fused” lack of differentiation	Some elaboration of governmental functions and beginning of specialization	“Refracted” high degree of specialization and professionalization based on science and managerial skills
<b>POLITICAL PARTICIPATION</b>	Subject participation (patrimonial)	Subject-citizen participation	Citizen participation, including articulation of interest groups. (Liberal democratic vs. mobilization regimes)

Ideology is a belief system.

*An ideology is a value or belief system that is accepted as fact or truth by some group. It is composed of sets of attitudes toward the various institutions and processes of society. It provides the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be, and in so doing, it organizes the tremendous complexity of the world into something fairly simple and understandable.*<sup>16</sup>

A social movement can rouse people when it can do three things: simplify ideas, establish a claim to the truth, and with a combination of the two exhort, commitment to action. This is what an ideology does. It transforms ideas as well as people. Commenting on the social functions of an ideology, Bell wrote :

*Within every operative society there must be some creed—a set of beliefs and values traditions and purposes—which links both the institutional networks and the emotional affinities of the members into some transcendental whole. And there have to be some mechanisms whereby those values can be not only "internalized" by individuals (through normal) but also made explicit for the society—specially one which seems consciously to shape social change; and this explicating task is the function of ideology.*<sup>17</sup>

Ideology promotes emotional solidarity, as is the case with Marxism and Leninism. Sorel's myth of the general strike is a classic example. Ideology provides a sense of orientation, when one is lacking. It mirrors a universal picture and a reference point for individual actions as well as social policies. It is futuristic in the sense it also accounts for hope for a better posterity. What distinguishes ideology from utopia is its plan of and commitment to 'action, or what Bell calls, its use as a "social lever". It should also be recognized that as ideology is an activity of the intelligentsia, and is action-oriented, exhorting commitment by the masses, interesting questions are raised as to whether and how it should be used by the elite to manipulate the masses. It may be used as a shield to hide the class interests. It may even blind the followers to facts.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>16</sup> L. T. Sargent, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*. Homewood, III : Dorsey Press, 1972 ; 1.

<sup>17</sup> D. Bell, "Ideology and Soviet Politics", *Slavic Review*, December 1965: 595. Also see his. *The End of Ideology* Glencoe, III : The Free Press, 1962: 401.

<sup>18</sup> T. Parsons observed that deviation from scientific objectivity is the hallmark of ideology. W. Stark also shows how it could blind people and argues against ideology. See D. Apter, *Ideology and Discontent*. Glencoe III: The

Controversy centers round the question what role radical ideology plays in contemporary politics. There is the 'decline of ideology' hypothesis, which claims that ideological politics which advocates radical social changes is of much less, significance and that this decline is beneficial. This may be true concerning the intensity of feeling towards "left" or "right" politics. The post-war era may have seen a de intensification of ideological polemics, when compared with the past. But the presence of ideologies and their role in politics cannot be denied. For example, La Palombara's study of Italian parties proves this.<sup>19</sup>

Shils suggested that in the West, due to affluence, there is a decline of extremist ideologies, but in the new nations there is the constant presence of ideology. In developing nations questions centering round industrialization, modernization and development generally provoke heated discussion and serious cleavages in the society.<sup>20</sup> However, two points need to be stressed here. First, such ideologies may lack a systematic exposition and fall far short of being dogmatic.<sup>21</sup> Second, a product of the previous point, there may not be a universally shared absolute ideology among all the nations and their leaders.<sup>22</sup> While it is

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Free Press, 1964; 15-46. Also see M. Rejai, 'Political Ideology: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives', in *Decline of Ideology*. M. Rejai, ed., Chicago : Aldine, Atherton, 1971: 1-32.

<sup>19</sup> LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology : A Dissent and Interpretation"

By an application of statistical techniques to symbols in "prestige papers" of France, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and the United States, over the past half a century, Lerner et al. found that the variety of symbols used are reduced in conditions of political crisis- war and totalitarianism. In other words, there is greater attention to fewer symbols in periods of tension. They also hypothesized that the time factor is less related to a variety in symbols than is the influence of events. See D. Lerner, I. de S. Pool and H. Lasswell, "Comparative Analysis of Political Ideology a Preliminary Statement", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15, winter 1951-52: 715-733.

<sup>20</sup> E. Shils. "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the Intellectuals". *Sewanee Review*, 66, July-September 1958: 450-480.

<sup>21</sup> Z. Brzezinski wrote: "...They tend to lack the systematic coherent, integrated, and intellectually sustained character of either socialism or communism, and there is an absence of formal dogmas and institutional embodiment." See his *Between Two Ages : America's Role in the Technetronic Era*. New York: The Viking Press, 1970: 113.

<sup>22</sup> Surprising as it may seem, even Marxism has found divergent variation as is evident from the writings of Lenin, Stalin, or Mao, facing the hard realities of political life prevailing in their respective countries. The 29 European Communist leaders affirmed at the last summit meeting "Complete independence" of each party in accordance with the socio-economic conditions and specific national features prevailing in the country

true that there may not be all-pervasive global, dogmatic ideologies in the present "technetronic" age,<sup>23</sup> the importance of a belief system in the lives of the people and the pursuance of certain social policies cannot be either ignored or deemphasized. This is admitted even by those writers who argued the end of ideology.<sup>24</sup>

Sartori highlighted the importance of ideology thus

*...Ideologies are the crucial lever at the disposal of elites for obtaining political mobilization and for maximizing the possibilities of mass manipulation. This, it seems... the single major reason that ideology is so important. We are concerned about ideologies because we are concerned, in the final analysis, with the power of man over man, with how populations and nations can be mobilized and manipulated all along the way that leads to political mechanism and fanaticism.*<sup>25</sup>

Bell also agrees with this view and stresses.

*There is now, more than ever, some need for utopia, in the sense men need-as they have needed-some vision of their potential, some means of fusing passion with intelligence.*<sup>26</sup>

In this chapter, ideology as a belief system is viewed in causal terms and also as a heuristic device.<sup>27</sup> First, it is necessary to ascertain

concerned". This in a way sounds end of communism. See *Time* (Weekly), 12 July, 1976, 24.

<sup>23</sup> For an explanation of this neologism, see Brzezinski, 9-23.

<sup>24</sup> Brzezinski argued: "Scientific complexity and skepticism-reinforced by the impressionistic effects at increased reliance on audiovisual communication (television)-work against the systematic and, dogmatic qualities of an ideology." Yet, he affirmed the importance of a belief system when he wrote: "Belief is an important social cement. A society that does not believe in anything is a society in a state of dissolution. The sharing of common aspirations and a unifying faith is essential to community life." See Brzezinski, op. cit., 117, and 241, respectively. It is also to be noted that the same media that may thwart a systematic ideology could also be used to effectively propagate a belief.

<sup>25</sup> G. Sartori, "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems", *APSR*, 63 (2: June) 1969, 411.

<sup>26</sup> While arguing that the end of ideology is not, and should not, be the end of utopia. Bell makes an empirical proposition that an "Utopia has to specify *where* one wants to go, how to get there, the costs of the enterprise and some realization of, and justification for the determination who is to pay". Bell, *The End of Ideology*, 405, (emphasis in the original).

<sup>27</sup> This approach is greatly influenced by G. Myrdal, who thought that all developing nations follow the ideology of planning, and A. Hirschman, who felt that "late-comer" societies have a tendency to pull ahead of understanding, resulting in pseudo creative responses. See G. Myrdal, *Asian*

whether ideology is serving as a guide and support to developmental policies. Second, does ideology serve to identify the various related problems and forge a link among them, thus providing a theoretical base for action and comprehensive planning? Given these two possibilities, it should be possible to establish an interdependent relationship between ideology and structures and social policies in so far as the former provides the norms for the latter.

### **Instrumentalism and Rational Comprehensive Change**

The politics of ideology may be contrasted with the politics of incrementalism. Incrementalism is the beneficiary of a developed situation where crucial value questions concerning social, economic, industrial, and scientific development have been largely resolved. Incrementalism is suspicious of a comprehensive view. Its argument is based on a limited rationality which is oriented towards direct and concrete experience rather than priori constructions or assumptions which claim to be self-evident or intuitively true. Perhaps the paradoxical restraint of developed societies can be explained on the ground that once structures are elaborated, the changes of improvements which suggest themselves, must be justified mainly by whether they can be beneficially added on to systems which have already proved themselves. This idea of incrementalism is contrary to the economic theory of democracy, as many economists believe and argue that man acts rationally and it is within the scope of government to maximize welfare.<sup>28</sup>

Expressing his disagreement with this idea of maximization, Simon advanced the concept of limited rationality.<sup>29</sup> Arguing that in a

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*Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations.* New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1968, especially Part IV: and A. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress.* New York : Twentieth Century Fund, 1963.

<sup>28</sup> This economic model was applied to party politics by A. Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper & Row, 1957. For an explicit discussion of the rational model of bureaucracy see M. Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations.* trans. by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons, Glencoe, III: The Free Press, 1957.

<sup>29</sup> That rationality in organizations may inhibit self-actualization of the individual employee was argued by other writers. See for example, C. Argyris, *Personality and Organization.* New York : Harper & Bros., 1957, *Interpersonal Competence and Organizational Effectiveness.* Homewood III : The Dorsey Press and Richard D. Irwin, 1962, *Management and Organizational Development.* New York: McGraw-Hill. 1971.

A distinguished treatment of the concept of self-actualization may be found in A.H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality.* New York : Harper & Row, 2nd edition, 1970.



highly complex environment, any individual's information and his problem solving capacity are after all finite. He summarized his thesis thus:

*The central concern of administrative theory is with the boundary between the rational and the non-rational aspects of human social behavior. Administrative theory is peculiarly the theory of intended and bounded rationality- of the behavior of human beings who *satisfice* because they do not have the wits to *maximize*.*<sup>30</sup>

This idea of limited rationality constitutes the pivot or incrementalism, of which Lindblom has come to be the high priest. Borrowing from Popper's concept of piecemeal planning for social and political change,<sup>31</sup> Lindblom developed his theory of "muddling through" and "disjointed incrementalism". He distinguished between two basic models of decision-making The Branch Method (Successive Limited Comparisons) and the Root Method (Rational-Comprehensive), "the former continually building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees; the latter starting from fundamentals anew each time, building on the past only as experience is embodied in a theory and always prepared to start completely from the ground up".<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> H. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*. New York : The Free Press, 1965, 2nd edition, xxiv (emphasis in the original).

For an exposition and critique of Simon's intended rationality, see Argyris, "Some Limits of Rational Man Organizational Theory", *PAR*, 33, (3 May-June) 1973: 253-267. For a rejoinder by Simon and reply by Argyris, see *PAR*, 33 (4 : July-August) 1973; 346-357.

The bureaucratic low level aspiration, their bungling, their coalitions and inter-group rivalries were explained by the use of *the concept of satisficing* (though not representing Simon's intentions) by A. Levin, *The Satisfices*. New York : McCall, 1970.

<sup>31</sup> As opposed to the holistic approach, which takes a comprehensive view of the social problems, and public in character and wants to mould the whole society and the future according to a particular plan, Popper suggests the "piecemeal social engineering" approach, based on a trial and error method, taking small steps and making slow progress. He even argued that the holistic approach, due to unforeseen consequences, will in fact revert to the piecemeal method. See K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*. New York : Harper & Row, 1964: 55-104. Also *The Open Society and its Enemies. II*, Princeton, New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1966, Chapter 23, especially, 222,

<sup>32</sup> C. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling through", *PAR*, 19 (2, Spring) 1959: 79-88. The theory found its first expression in R. A. Dahl and C. E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economics and Welfare*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1953.

The rational-comprehensive model or synoptic problem-solving, as he called it latter, assumes that the decision-maker (1) identifies, scrutinizes, and puts into consistent order those objectives and other values that he believes should govern choice of a solution to the problem; (2) comprehensively surveys all possible means of achieving those values; (3) exhaustively examines the probable consequences of employing each of the possible means; and (4) chooses a means that is a particular policy or combination of policies that will probably achieve a maximum of the values or reach some acceptable level of achievement.<sup>33</sup> This model does not work, according to Lindblom, for it is too much of a challenge to any man's intelligence. It is beyond the capacity of the decision maker to understand and foresee all important factors due to the definite limitations on human intellectual capabilities and also the availability and cost of information. It does not take into consideration the various adaptations to be made by the decision-maker in each situation. He summed up his arguments in the following words:

*...For sufficiently complex problems values will never be well articulated, possible alternative policies will never be fully canvassed, and possible consequences of each considered alternative will never be fully investigated, the decision-maker has to acknowledge that he must take short cuts, must leave important aspects of his problems out of his analysis, must make adjustments on the basis of values only roughly perceived, and must make do with dodges and stratagems that are not scientifically respectable.<sup>34</sup>*

As an alternative he advocated Successive Limited Comparisons, and suggested that changes should be made incrementally. He defined incrementalism as:

*...a method of social action that takes existing reality as one alternative and compares the possible gains and losses of closely related alternatives by making relatively small adjustments in existing reality, or making larger adjustments about whose consequences approximately as much is known as about the consequences of existing reality or both.<sup>35</sup>*

<sup>33</sup> C. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy*. New York: The Free Press, 1965, 137-138.

<sup>34</sup> *Idem*, *Strategies of Decision Making*, Edmund James Lecture, Urbana : Department of Political Science, University of Illinois, 1971 : 7-8.

<sup>35</sup> In fairness to Lindblom, it should be mentioned he admits that "incrementalism should not be confused with a simple commitment to the idea that gradual change is always preferable to rapid change". He also

Policy, after all, is a successive approximation to some desired objective. Claiming that policy "does not move by leaps and bounds", he concludes that "non-incremental policy proposals are therefore typically not only politically irrelevant but also unpredictable in their consequences." Incrementalism permits both the survival and the continued alteration of the operating organization. This model, according to him, has an added advantage in that any mistake that may have been committed will be small and can be easily corrected without any great damage. For that matter, a small change is also acceptable to the many. In fact, he gives a qualitative definition of a good policy as the one that is acceptable to most.<sup>36</sup> This method is highly recommended for a pluralist society where the political processes work under pressures and counter pressures. In actual operation, incrementalism will result anyway, according to Lindblom.

It is true that incrementalism provides maximum security in charge, as it does not permit any radical shifts. It is also conceded that this is what may very well happen in actual policy making, particularly in a developed, pluralist society. But the adequacy of such an approach in a developing country, attempting comprehensive ideological reform needs to be tested. Its shortcomings seem to be increasing when it is used as a normative strategy. Lindblom makes almost a fatal assumption when he states that "not always, but in a remarkably large number of circumstances, policies that are more than incrementally different from existing policies are irrelevant because (they are) impossible to inaugurate."<sup>37</sup> One wonders how he can explain the big jumps that were made even in a pluralist society such as the United States; for example, the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt or the development of the atom bomb during the World War II. These may be explained away as being exceptions, perhaps.

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mentions that 'scientific method incrementalism and calculated risk are on a continuum of policy methods'. However, there is no mistaking the fact that he opts for incrementalism. Writing that "revolutionaries have invariably underestimated the persistence of operating codes and norms and their own capacity for replacing the old with new ones to their liking", he goes to say that in the Western societies-durable polyarchies, as he prefers to call them, social change follows an incremental pattern. See Dahl and Lindblom, p. 82-85.

<sup>36</sup> Lindblom, "The Science of Muddying Through", 34-85. A. Wildavsky, "Annual Expenditure Increment" is a very good example of incrementalism. See his, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 2nd edition, 1974: 230-240.

<sup>37</sup> Lindblom, *Strategies of Decision Making*, 11.

Brief mention has to be made of some of the criticisms of Lindblom's incrementalism. Dror admits that incrementalism is most likely where there is a high degree of social stability. But he argues that this does not work when past policies are undesirable, or, for that matter, when there are no past policies as such. Moreover, improved technological and behavioral knowledge, better equips the policy-maker to do more than simply muddle through. Criticizing incrementalism as being pro-inertia and anti-innovative, he suggests a normative optimum model, wherein extra-rational processes such as intuitive judgements, creative inventions, and the like will be allowed to play a significant role in an effort to increase the rationality content.<sup>38</sup>

It should also be seen here that by following an incremental strategy, over time, one may even lose sight of the very objectives that were originally set. It may also happen that one may get into a situation that he did not originally intend or anticipate. Simple muddling through may lead to unintended consequences, thus.<sup>39</sup> Other problems regarding incrementalism have been brought out, of late. There has been certain ambiguity in the usage of the word 'incremental ism'. It is often used to connote both the decision-making process and the pattern of policy outputs. In the latter case, great difficulty arises in defining what exactly is an incremental output.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Dror, "Muddling Through-Science' or Inertia", PAR, 24 (3 : September) 1964 : 153-157. See also in the same issue, the reply by Lindblom, "Context for Change and Strategy", 157-158, and further discussion by R. W. Jones, "The Model as a Decision Maker's Dilemma", 158-163, and M. McCleery, "On Remarks Taken out of Context". 160-163, and W. Heyderbrand. "Administration of Social Change", 163-165. A critique of the various models of decisionmaking and a further exposition of Dror's optimal model may be seen in his *Policy-Making Reexamined*, Scranton, Pa : Chandler, 1968, especially. Chapters 12, 13, 14 and 15.

<sup>39</sup> Explaining that the Washington Post got into the Watergate scandal during the Nixon Administration incrementally, H. Simmons, Managing Editor of the newspaper, commented: tell you it's like being in a bath tub, where scientifically...you turn the water a little bit hotter at a time and burn yourself to death without realizing it because the increments are so small that the body doesn't understand or feel... Quoted by C. Bernstein and B. Woodward, *All the President's Men*. New York : Simon and Schuster, 1974:236

<sup>40</sup> Arguing on the these lines, J. J. Bailey and R. J. O'Connor concluded that "it may prove useful to limit incrementalism as a concept to describe only the individual's intellectual response to complexity, or to characterize the bargaining process..." See their, "Operationalizing Incrementalism:

Thus, it appears that there is no single effective decision making technique. As Etzioni believed, a combination of both rational comprehensive and incremental decision-making could be advantageously used. Etzioni advocated the "mixed-scanning" approach, this combines the elements of both, yet it is neither utopian like the former in its assumptions, nor conservative like the latter in its working.<sup>41</sup>

Interestingly enough, Lindblom admitted the possibility of misunderstanding his theory and came to the same conclusion. He agreed that his theory can be misused, just as the conventional method can be, and does not offer this as the alternative to conventional method of scientific problem-solving. This is only an example of what the search for stratagem may produce. And finally, he states that his disjointed instrumentalism does not "constitute a very good system for rational decision-making. I do not believe that for complex problems men yet have any good decision-making procedures".<sup>42</sup>

One cannot reasonably speak of administrative reform without defining the goals that he wishes to achieve. It should also be remembered that different structures can produce policy differences and vice versa. Structures are not to be construed as mere instruments,

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Measuring the Muddle", *PAR*, 35, (1 : January-February) 1975 : 65. See also the communications In *PAR*, 35, (3 : May-June) 1975 311-312. and *PAR* ; 35, (5 : September-October) 1975 : 563-564.

That different criteria were used by different writers to distinguish an incremental from a non incremental spending output can be seen from the following writings : R. Fenno, *The Power of the Purse*. Boston : Little, Brown, 1966; I. Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support and Budget Success in State Legislatures" *APSR*, 62, December 1968 : 1220-1231 and T. Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

<sup>41</sup> See A. Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision Making". *PAR*, 28 (5: December) 1962.

<sup>42</sup> Lindblom, *Strategies of Decision Making*, 15-16, Claiming that the current theories of bureaucratic rationality do not adequately and properly define the concept, S. G. Hajjar, proposes a normative and subjective theory and calls it "projected rationality", in his "Towards Understanding the Concept of Bureaucratic Rationality", *Indian Journal of Public Administration (IIPA)* 19 (2 : April-June), 1973 : 148-162.

Projected rationality to him "indicates the decision-making process which allows for the expression of values and which points to the manner by which these values can be verified in bureaucracy. This concept prescribes what must be, rather than what is. It focuses on decisions as distinguished from choices. As such, the discussion will have to focus on those relations that must exist between the decision-maker, the bureaucratic setting and the subject matter of the decision", 156-157.

but may also reflect the ideology of the nation. Thus, the problem is to find the best fit between the goals and the structures.

Consistent with the two methods of study of ref as explained above, the following rough typology bureaucracy may be given in each of the cases (Figure II). The goal of a developing nation is the transformation of society. In the developed, it is the rationalization of administration. This difference leads to a different view of the roles of bureaucracy: the former as "ideologues" and the latter as "incrementalist".

**Figure II**

<b>Ideologues</b>	<b>Incrementalists</b>
1. Reform-minded	Conventional
2. Interested in ideas	No strong ideas, hence neutral
3. Innovative and entrepreneuring	Sensitive to tradition and precedent
4. Risk-taking	Cautious
5. Blur the politics administration dichotomy	May subscribe to politics administration dichotomy

It would be irrelevant to talk of administrative reform in isolation. To put in systems terminology, the political and administrative systems are actually the subject-systems of the society and thus interact with the rest. Hence the need to see that successful reform attempts to deal with three aspects: political, bureaucratic, and social. The fact that post-revolutionary bureaucracies tend to carry over pre-revolutionary ideologies of political leaders, underlines the importance of comprehensive reforms. The efficiency and honesty of political leaders, the social mood, and the cultural milieu are important determinants that should be attended to this emphasizes the importance of the ecological approach and also the concept of balance.

### **The Ecological Approach**

Ecology, Webster's New World Dictionary states, is a "branch of biology that deals with the relations between living organisms and their environment", and "in sociology, the relationship between the distribution of human groups with reference to material resources, and the consequent social and cultural patterns". People and places are inseparable and the institutions that they create bear an unmistakable evidence of their influence. To understand the latter, one must get to the former. Way back in 1945, Gaus highlighted the importance of this approach when he stated a list of seven factors to explain "the ebb and

flow of functions of government": people, place, physical technology, social technology, wishes and ideas, catastrophe, and personality. To quote him:

*An ecological approach to public administration builds... quite literally from the ground up; from the elements of a place soils, climate, location, for example-to the people who live there-their members and ages and knowledge, and the ways of relationships with one another, they get their living. It is within this setting that their instruments and practices of public housekeeping should be studied so that they may better understand what they are doing. Such an approach is of particular interest to us as students seeking to cooperate in our studies; for it invites-indeed is dependent upon careful observation by many people in different environments of the roots of government functions, civil attitudes and operating problems.*<sup>43</sup>

A present-day strong advocate of this approach is Riggs.<sup>44</sup> Remarking that "governmental setting is one of the fundamental determinants of administrative behavior", he focuses attention of five other elements of American life: the economic, social, symbolic, communicative, and

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<sup>43</sup> J. M. Gaus, *Reflections on Public Administration*. Alabama : University Press, 1947 : 8-9.

The beginnings of this approach may be traced back to classical political philosophy. For example, Plato thought that states are not made cut of "oak and rock". "Do you know... that governments vary as the disposition of men vary, and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot suppose that States are made of 'oak and rock', and not out of the human nature which are in them? Yes... the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters'." See Plato, *The Republic*, Book III: 544, trans. B Jowett, New York Vintage Books, Random House.

Aristotle contended that the constitutions reflect the disposition and character of the people living under. To him, what is needed is the introduction of a system of government which the people involved will accept, and feel able to operate starting with what they have got." Aristotle, *The Politics*, Book IV, Chapter I (Section I), trans. T. A. Sinclair, Penguin Classic, 1962.

<sup>44</sup> F.W. Riggs, *The Ecology of Public Administration*. Bombay : Asia, 1962, and also "The Structures of Government and Administrative Reform", in R. Braibanti, ed., 226-234.

For empirical studies on this, see for example, J. Forward, "Toward an Empirical Framework for the Ecological Studies in Comparative Public Administration," in N. Raphaeli, ed., *Readings in Comparative Public Administration*. Boston : Allyn and Beacon, 1967 : 450-472.

Also R. K. Arora and A. Ferreros, "A Dimensional Approach in the Ecology of Public Bureaucracies-An Addendum to John Forward", *IJPA*. 18 (2: April-June) 1972: 200-215.

political. His analysis of the systems in the United States, Philippines, and Thailand yielded him the 'refracted', "fused", and "prismatic" societies, respectively.

It should be stressed here that I do not suggest that any reform must necessarily be designed within the social context only, as that would be self-defeating. The argument is that the reforms must be cognizant of these limitations and should try to reform comprehensively. Any reform attempt should keep the entire social and political fabric as its target.

### **The Principle of Linkage and Balance**

The concept of linkage and balance deals with the relationship between political, bureaucratic, and social factors, and involves specifically the relationship between cultural and ideological variables and administrative procedures and behavior. I suggest that administrative reform, without adequate linkage to political and social factors, results in reform ritualism and innocuous incrementalism.<sup>45</sup> This is true in both developed and developing countries. This needs to be explored in greater detail in order to gain an insight into the obstacles to genuine reform.

To sum up, reform should make public administration a fit instrument for carrying out social and economic goals of development and also one which is responsive to the people.<sup>46</sup> Put in a different way, what are the preconditions for a creative and effective bureaucracy in a modernizing situation?

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<sup>45</sup> O. Hirschman used the term "Reform mongering", in his study of the Latin American experience, *op. cit.*, 276.

<sup>46</sup> See Government of India Resolution No. 49-3-65 -AR(P), Ministry of Home Affairs, Department of Administrative Reforms. New Delhi, 5 January 1966, creating the Administrative Reforms Commission.



# 5

## **Administrative Reform and Institutional Bureaucracies**

WESLEY E. BJUR  
GERALD E. CAIDEN

Throughout recorded history there have been administrative reform movements, reformers and reforms. While impressive results have been achieved, much failure must also be acknowledged. Reforms have not lasted too long after the initial burst of enthusiasm that brought them about, simply because of the sporadic, isolated and piecemeal fashion in which they were introduced and the failure to follow them through and evaluate their effects. Only recently has it been realized that to achieve lasting results administrative reform needs to be carefully planned and implemented in a coordinated, consistent and systematic manner. The United Nations organization has adopted comprehensive administrative reform as an important part of its development program. In this, it has been supported by its member states, several of its specialized agencies, multi-national technical assistance schemes, leading universities, large private research foundations and the World Bank.

This interest in administrative reform is hardly surprising. No country is satisfied with the performance of its administrative system. Even with ready access to the latest administrative technology governments find they cannot live up to their promises and the results they achieve rarely last. Organizational and administrative instruments seem inadequate to cope with the new burdens being placed on them by aspiring people everywhere. Instant action is demanded, and before anything new can be properly consolidated, a host of other demands have to be met. Political leaders want short-cuts and are impatient with experts who plead for more time and additional resources. As most countries lack adequate institutions, suitable organizational structures, sufficient qualified people, and proper administrative support, political leaders blame their policy advisers and administrative experts when things go wrong. Too many of them expect instant miracles from administrative reform as a solution, ignoring the fact that good

administration alone cannot overcome chronic political instability, changing patterns of international trade, corruption, and lack of defined governmental policies. If the truth be known, administrative performance is probably better than represented, given the circumstances, and the surprise is what administrators achieve so many handicaps. Nevertheless, much can and should be done to improve administrative systems.

New states in particular have acknowledged their need to prioritize administrative reform in their developmental efforts. They realized that their forward push had to be stimulated by governmental initiatives, relying largely on state machinery, public enterprise, and bureaucratic instruments. But their pre-state administrative systems, whether traditional or colonial, were not designed for developmental roles or were suffused with bureaucratic inertia. Their whole structures-or what was left of them by the departing imperial rulers-had to be revamped and reconstructed to accord with the new reality. Further, the bureaucratic state would need new national leadership, while at the same time having to replace vestiges of traditional or colonial legacies with new administrative technology. In many cases it was clear what had to be done. National plans had to be formulated to determine priorities and clarify attainable objectives. Foreigners had to be replaced by local people. New ministries and public enterprises had to be established for new state activities. Foreign owned public utilities and possibly other basic industries had to be nationalized. The civil service system had to be reorganized, overhauled and made to accord with local, not foreign, realities. New administrative technology had to be acquired and incorporated. New ethical codes for official conduct had to be devised and inculcated. Often special machinery was created to see that these ambitious administrative schemes were carried out. Foreign experts were hired and foreign aid was sought to help in implementation. Investments were made in institution-building and administrative infrastructure. The new corps of professional administrative reformers began to exchange information among themselves and slowly a new field of study emerged with an accumulating literature on planned organizational change.

The boom has not lasted long. The momentum has definitely declined since the 1960's. Disillusionment is evident in international circles among foreign assistance experts, and within national reform campaigns. The expected miracles have not occurred. Worse still, administrative system in several states seem to be worse than they were a quarter of a century ago. Changing administrative systems has proven

to be an exceedingly difficult task. If some countries appeared to be more fortunate than others, it is probably because they are better at concealing their administrative problems. What has gone wrong? Nothing really, or at least, nothing the administrative reformers could have avoided.

First, in several states, administrative reform never had a chance. In them, crisis had followed crisis, emergency had followed emergency. Everything has gone wrong since independence. They have been involved in wars with neighbors. They have suffered civil strife and chronic instability. Their economics have collapsed. They have been ravaged by drought, plague, earthquakes, tidal waves, insurrection and terror. Their administrators have been so busy fire-fighting and improvising that they have never gotten around to administrative reform.

Second, almost every state had underestimated the time factor, what had taken the advanced countries centuries to achieve they have wanted to encapsulate into one generation. It cannot be done so quickly.

Third, besides time, other resources needed to change administrative systems have not been available. Some states are too poor to mobilize any, resources at all. Others have been unable to mobilize sufficient or have had to divert them to more pressing needs or to change their priorities and postpone administrative reform. Foreign aid has been grossly inadequate and the paid for it has often been too high.

Fourth, the inertia of traditional and colonial arrangements has been too strong. The entrenched administrators, the "establishment," has proven too powerful politically and socially to move in new directions. Indeed, sometimes as the only stable factor amidst instability, they have strengthened their position. They have set the tone and the new generation venerates and emulates them. They are perpetuated not changed. They claim that although the administrative system may be defective, it still works, which is more than can be said about untried alternatives, and they emphasize its overlooked advantages and forgotten benefits.

Fifth, expert prognosis proved incorrect. National planning solved nothing; it was merely idle blue printing. Structural overhauls turned out to be purely cosmetic. They never touched attitudes, behavior or performance. Foreign models just would not work at all. They were alien to the environment and never took root. They were simplistic,

readymade solutions, outmoded and irrelevant even before they were tried.

Sixth, there simply was a failure to follow through. Political leaders merely paid lip-service to the idea of administrative reform. They had no intention of doing anything about it, not when it might challenge their power base or corrupt practices. Inexperienced leaders lacked a proper appreciation of the importance of administration in carrying out national development. They believed that the administration would look after itself. Experienced leaders, in contrast, on taking office wished they could abandon the administrative system they inherited and start all over again, but found it was impossible to overcome the unbreakable commitments, the foregone alternatives, the attitudes, images and impressions, the habits, customs and ingrained ways of doing things. They contented themselves with purely symbolic changes. They filtered titles, shifted staff, redistributed offices, tried obvious and simple remedies, and showed intent, but could not go further.

There were, of course, other practical problems, particularly failure in implementation. These have been summarized as (a) a bad beginning, where the reformers did not have sufficient grasp of the situation to realize that they were unacceptable or their reforms were unworkable or they merely reinforced existing deficiencies by advocating more of the same; their reforms were still-born; (b) imitation not innovation, where reforms were exact copies of what had succeeded elsewhere but would fail in this particular situation or would remain unimplemented as ritual affirmation of administrative ethics because people already knew what to do but they did not know how to do it; (c) incorrect diagnosis, where reformers misinterpreted the facts or got sidetracked into inconsequential or they accepted too much without question; (d) hidden intentions, where the reformers had or were suspected of having hidden agendas of their own and no one would co-operate with them as a result; (e) indecisive approach, where the reformers could not agree even among themselves as to the scope, magnitude of change, rate of change and the comprehensiveness of their proposals and failed to convince people that they were serious; (f) faulty planning, where the reformers could not operationalize their reforms; (g) unduly restrictive techniques and instrumentalities, where the reformers were overly conservative in their choice of strategies, switched from macro-reforms to technical trivia, and failed to attract creative talent and transform it into a critical mass of congenial reform advocates; (h) inability to command resources; (i) no monitoring,

which meant that the reformers did not know to what extent their reforms were being modified or altered; (j) absence of feedback, which meant that the reformers had no idea what was really happening at all; (k) evaluation ignored, which meant that the reformers did not know whether their reforms were actually working or doing the things they were supposed to do; and (l) goal displacement, where the intentions of reformers were subordinated to other objectives, and administrative reform was only a pretext for political, social, cultural and economic change.<sup>1</sup>

However, one basic flaw in administrative reform strategy which has not been analyzed adequately has been the failure to appreciate the difference between reforming instrumental and institutional bureaucracies. It had been assumed too readily that all governmental agencies were instrumental bureaucracies in the Weberian mode. As such, it was assumed that they could be reformed administratively merely by persuading their political overseers that reform was needed, devising the necessary reforms, and expecting the governmental agencies as good instrumental bureaucracies to follow their instructions to reform accordingly. In fact, many governmental agencies, particularly in new states, were institutional bureaucracies. They had no intention or riveting back to being instrumental bureaucracies. They had built up their autonomy, become used to working virtually independently of political overseers, and cherished their ability to decide their own arrangements. They resented this intrusion into their internal affairs by upstart administrative reformers and did not care too much for political overseers who did not seem to trust them to conduct their affairs as they saw fit. Instead of being meekly obedient as expected, they challenged the right of political leaders to dictate to them, they resisted any attempt by outsiders to impose administrative reforms on them, and they mustered their own independent power base to force political overseers to back down. Where political leaders were weak, inexperienced, incompetent, lazy, indifferent, pre-occupied or unfit, institutional bureaucracies got their way. They were exempted from general instructions, accorded special privileges, and generally left to go their own way. Unreformed and harder to change than ever before.

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<sup>1</sup> G. E. Caiden, "Implementation: The Achilles Heel of Administrative Reform" in A. F. Leemans ed. *The Management of Change in Government*. The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1976: 145-164.

Whatever, the reasons, such institutional bureaucracies could not be reformed according to the instrumentational thesis. In their case, it was virtually irrelevant what the political overseers were persuaded to order. They would go their own way irrespective of orders to change since political leaders had little control over them. The reforms that were applicable to instrumental bureaucracies were not necessarily relevant or apt for the institutional bureaucracies. In any event, the institutional bureaucracies could pick and choose what reforms, if any, they would adopt. They invariably maintained that their special circumstances warranted exemption from general orders. They had the ability to resist and sabotage any imposed orders. They would rally support from their clients to demonstrate that maintenance of their services was more important than any administrative reform. They had to be treated for what they really were, namely, autonomous institutions with a strong societal following and political entities in their own right. They could not be approached for reform purposes like instrumental bureaucracies. For this reason, many attempts to reform them have failed.

In the future, care must be taken to distinguish between instrumental and institutional bureaucracies, and to devise different reform strategies for the latter. Customarily, the distinction has been glossed over by concentrating on the Weberian essence of bureaucracy, that is, the rationalization of collective activities organized in a formal hierarchy of authority around a system of impersonal rules which define role, functions and responsibilities.<sup>2</sup> This view was reinforced by Woodrow Wilson's conceptual dichotomy between policy and administration,<sup>3</sup> Frederick Taylor's philosophy of scientific management,<sup>4</sup> and formal organization theory<sup>5</sup> as analyzed by Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick. Current public administration mythology still holds that the ideal or normal state of an administrative bureaucracy is instrumental to a public or private owner, that is, it should respond as a tool to accomplish what its owner desires.

In contrast, Philip Selznick distinguished between instrumental organizations and societal institutions.<sup>6</sup> When an organization created

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<sup>2</sup> H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, *From Max Weber Essays in Sociology*. New York : Oxford University Press, 1946: 196.

<sup>3</sup> W. Wilson, "The Study of Administration", *Political Science Quarterly* (2: June) 1887 : 179-222.

<sup>4</sup> F. W. Taylor, *Scientific Management*. New York : Harper and Row, 1947.

<sup>5</sup> L. Gullick and L. Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration*. New York : Institute of Public Administration, 1937

<sup>6</sup> P. Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*. Evanston, Illinois : Row, Peterson and Co., 1957 : 5

for instrumental purposes transcends that role and develops an expressive or value significance for both its membership and the community, it passes from being a mere instrument to becoming an institution. Institutions are not dispensable as are tools; they are valued as having intrinsic worth apart from their instrumental utility. In their case, permanence or survival assumes a greater importance than economy or efficiency. When it comes to evaluating their performance or renovating them, they must be treated differently from instrumental organizations.

A public bureaucracy can be institutionalized in two predominant ways. It can be created as an autonomous entity, that is, free from political control, as, for example, the independent regulatory commissions in the United States of America and several public enterprises in other countries. Alternatively, it may develop autonomy over time by outlasting several generations of political leaders. The first route can be termed assigned autonomy and the second accrued autonomy. In the cases of assigned autonomy, the public bureaucracy is created with a deliberate mandate to develop an independent value position which mediates between competing social interests. It is expected to enforce its own derived values made in the larger public interest, and to see that they are followed. Such assigned autonomy leads fairly quickly to institutional status, although it may take up to a decade to complete the institutionalization process in which wide recognition and legitimacy guarantee its permanence.

An instrumental public agency develops institutional autonomy more slowly. It has to build up symbiotic relationships with important client and support groups. It has to become identified as having an exclusive function responsibility in a given public arena for a considerable time. Two prominent examples, again drawn from the United States, are the U. S. Department of Agriculture and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Their institutional autonomy is supported by the voluntary associations and professional groups which have grown up around them over many years of stable relationships and reciprocal support. Their permanence or survival spans several generations of political and administrative leaders. They are supported as much by tradition and widespread societal legitimacy as they are by concurrently existing satellite bodies with which they transact.

Among developing countries, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) provides a good example of an institutionalized bureaucracy. The CSP, a high level administrative cadre carried over from the British colonial period, has constituted the backbone of the governmental service in

Pakistan since its independence. Professional values internalized by CSP officers have guaranteed exemplary performance in official functions by magistrates, governors, district officers and financial officers for many generations, insuring honesty, evenhandedness, adherence to policies and directives and fair administration of justice. However, when the post independence government embarked on a multifaceted campaign to develop different sectors of the economy, and began creating new entities to introduce desired changes in agriculture, education, health, nutrition and birth control, the CSP cadre turned out to be; as often as not, an obstacle to the creation and implementation of programs which it could not control itself, or which it viewed as a threat to its prestige and power in government and society. Using its institutional privileges, it was able to resist the creation of parallel agencies to implement programs beyond its own staffing capabilities. It protected its elite status from dilution by dallying months and years in adding new officers to its cadre even when authorized to do so. It resisted repeated efforts to reform its traditional structural divisions and the status relationships between them. It blocked attempts to reform personnel selection and promotion practices. Thus, professional integrity and high personal commitment to the values of the organization have been counterbalanced by the use of institutional privilege to perpetuate the self-serving concerns of its members.

Khan lists a number of factors<sup>7</sup> which have contributed to the high level of institutionalization of the CSP cadre:

1. A strong ideological commitment. The CSP cadre, as well as Pakistan's officialdom in general, seemed "proud of its imperial bureaucratic heritage" and was "uncommonly pre-occupied with the presumed piety of the British system."<sup>8</sup> Braibanti has written that:

*The CSP is perhaps unique among the systems inheriting the imperial tradition... in the respect that its sense of exclusiveness and imperiousness have only been slightly affected since independence. It remains a distinctive, cohesive entity, with a high degree of elan.*<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> M. M. Khan, "Resistance to Change: Failure of Administrative Reform Efforts in the Civil Service of Pakistan". Unpublished Ph.D, Dissertation. Los Angeles: School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, 1976.

<sup>8</sup> Nazim, Babus, Brahmans and Bureaucrats: A Critique of Administrative System in Pakistan. Lahore : People's Publishing House, 1973.

<sup>9</sup> R. Braibanti, "The Higher Bureaucracy in Pakistan" in Braibanti et. al. eds. *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from British Imperial. Tradition:* Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1966 : 245.



Although some have called these British colonial values "alien" to Pakistani culture, nevertheless they are widely recognized in the society at large and reaffirmed within the civil service system.

2. A traditionally oriented leadership elite. At the time of their independence from Britain in 1947, fifty British expatriate chose to remain in the Pakistani civil service, constituting at that time 34 per cent of its membership, key divisions of the CSP were under these expatriate officers until the early 1960's, and many of the early reorganization reports and studies were done under the guidance of British officers.
3. A negative attitude toward politicians. In the post-colonial era, the relative instability of the political sector left the CSP as virtually the only cohesive and organized administrative force in the country, able to keep the country going even during times of considerable turbulence.
4. A paternalistic attitude towards the people. It is as though the masses both wanted and expected to be treated as "children" by their administrative rulers. So highly legitimized was the CSP that this paternalism seemed natural to both officials and people.
5. The elite character of the CSP, The CSP cadre maintained its elitist position by (a) keeping its size small; (b) reserving key posts in the government for its members; (c) prohibiting lateral entry to its ranks; and (d) carefully indoctrinating its members. It had its own national association which took a leading role in protecting the interests of its members while at the same time providing guidelines as to how CSP officers were supposed to conduct themselves in public and private. It was to control its own recruitment, training and indoctrination, disciplinary proceedings, performance ratings, promotions and transfers, and administrative investigations. In short, it was (and still remains to a large extent) completely autonomous.

From Khan's analysis, it would seem that there is no pure model of either instrumental or institutional bureaucracy. Each has some features of the other. The difference is one of degree. The extent to which a public agency has become institutionalized can be gauged by the following general characteristics:

- a. **Age:** According to Selznick<sup>10</sup>, any organization that persists for any length of time does not remain free of institutionalizing

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<sup>10</sup> Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, 5,

tendencies, because these are the result of naturally occurring social needs and pressures originating within the organization as well as within the societal environment. Any new organization when attempting to ensure its survival will inevitably move toward institutional status as it builds an internal esprit de corps, rewards exemplary behavior and commitment, improves efficiency, and cultivates good client relations.

- b. **Lack of Political Responsiveness:** An ideal public bureaucracy does only what it is ordered to do by the elected representatives of the people, according to traditional political and administrative theory. Unfortunately, some of the most beneficial characteristics of institutionalization—commitment to purpose, high motivation, high productivity, decisional and resource autonomy—in the end create a condition of organizational inertia which tends to perpetuate all of the things the entity has learned in its formative years. Now matured, it feels itself the legitimate owner of its corner of the public universe, and is predictably unresponsive to suggestions from politicians that it modify values, priorities or programs.
- c. **Lack of Public Accountability in Decision Making:** An important part of institutional quality is the ability to "earn" resources and to feel some autonomy in their expenditure. The same applies to the way it structures itself internally, its selection and promotion of personnel, and its ways of transacting with individuals and client groups. Thus an institutional bureaucracy is not likely to recognize the need to explain its "administrative" decisions to any and all questioners. It will tend to continue to act independently as much as possible.
- d. **Application of Administrative Law:** A standard instrumental bureaucracy is both formally and actually subject to the dictates of administrative law in its operations and in the resolution of conflicts and appeals. Interestingly, many highly institutionalized entities are exempted from different aspects of administrative law. They are declared "special cases" for purposes of the law, and are dealt with as such.
- e. **Tenure Rights:** An instrumental bureaucracy is usually subject to general civil service procedures. Competence and "merit" are the criteria for employment; nothing related to individual value and commitment is supposed to influence staffing decisions. But in an institutional bureaucracy personal values are im-

portant internally. Group norms prevail; they set the standards. Organizational loyalty and exemplary behavior come to be rewarded with extra remunerations, promotions prestige and eventual leadership responsibility. For this motivation system to work properly, the organization must be able to promote from within, protect itself from imposed lateral entry, and above all guarantee tenure of position for its own people.

- f. **Moral Awe** : Not only do institutional bureaucracies control their own recruitment, indoctrination, proceedings, performance ratings, promotions, and even administrative investigations into their operations, they are so valued by the wider society that none dare take action against obvious self-serving policies. The moral values of honesty, fairness, good judgment and technical excellence reinforce a sense of moral rightness in the minds of the populace about their functioning. Such is the strength of this moral awe that they are allowed to serve as their own consciences, and to speak for themselves in terms of how they should be judged by the wider society.

It should be apparent from these identifying criteria that an institutional bureaucracy does not respond to administrative reform in the same way as an instrumental bureaucracy. The institution is independent of normal adherence to hierarchical concepts of political authority and control. It has autonomy stemming from its ability to develop and promote certain values in the wider society. It can resist imposed changes because it can rally supporters to its defense from external interference and it is master in its own household. Political leaders have not had much success in forcing deinstitutionalization or in dismantling an institution held in high public esteem. The President of the United States has not been able to do very much about the institutionalized federal bureaucracies, and the military dictatorships could not make much impact on the Civil Service of Pakistan. In the final analysis, imposition could not be made to work but at such a heavy cost that it may not be worthwhile to try.

Imposed reform involves a power struggle with the institutionalized bureaucracies and if the political leadership is weak it will be the loser in the confrontation unless it is willing to resort to police state methods to end open defiance. Even if it does use such strong measures, resistance and subterfuge are likely to persist, making for low morale and low productivity to

the detriment of the bureaucracy's clients. The experience may not only cause unnecessary suffering to the innocent but may destroy all enterprise and initiative in the public sector.

Reforming institutional bureaucracies is political rather than managerial. No standard formulas can be applied. Reformers, as political campaigners, have to abandon consistency and uniformity. They have to tackle each institutional bureaucracy on its merits; for each, different concessions will have to be made and different compromises struck. For each the process of transformation will take different forms over varying time periods. Yet, some generalizations can be made.

First, as long as institutional bureaucracies feel confident that nothing will happen if they don't change, they won't change. They have to feel threatened or challenged. Forever lurking in the background should be a clear implication that if they don't put their house in order, they will be abolished, abandoned, bypassed or coerced. They should never be allowed to assume that they are indispensable or unassailable. Second, as long as they need to develop and maintain legitimacy they are vulnerable. Achieving legitimacy is a laborious and lengthy process requiring continuous evidence that the organization is doing a good job. They have to be careful about any criticism that could mar the image they foster about themselves, particularly old and venerated institutions which have settled back to rest on their laurels while becoming less productive, less efficient, less receptive to change, and interested in self-perpetuation of leadership elites and of institutional privilege. This would suggest that some naturally-occurring self-correction processes could be employed if : a) the legitimacy of an institution's mission were questioned by ranking political and social spokesmen, thus testing the currency of its goals, it's very right to exist, and potentially its ability to redefine its goals and activities in the public interest; b) its values were openly challenged, causing it to re justify itself; c) its status and standing with its clients and with the community generally were shaken by revelations or hints of scandal, fraud or misuse of authority; d) its monopoly position were invaded by limited competition to keep it lean, trim and on its toes administratively.

The key to the reform of institutional bureaucracies, in short, would appear to be the questioning of the legitimacy of the institution, and

thereby, its autonomy and self-direction, by placing it, along with its values and practices, under the spotlight of public scrutiny. In the case of the U.S. Federal Bureau of investigation, for example, it was the erosion of public confidence during the final years of the J. Edgar Hoover era that finally brought about a serious loss of prestige for the institution and its loss of autonomy. To shake the public's faith in the institution's traditional legitimacy is virtually to force it to re-evaluate its values and practices in the interests of restoring its legitimacy.

External pressures work on the simple premise that all bureaucrats, whether staffing instrumental or institutional bureaucracies, are insecure. They dread losing their jobs. They may not be able to find alternative employment. After all, there is little demand for discredited ex-police chiefs and cashiered generals. The jobs they find may not carry with them the same conditions and privileges. Even if they do not lose their jobs, discredited performance is a blow to the ego. It is as if that portion of one's life devoted to building and defending the institution has been a waste, and nobody likes to believe that his life has been misspent. Thus it should not surprise that institutional bureaucrats react fiercely to external criticism and threats. While publicly denying all wrong-doing, they will try to head off further criticism by seeking scapegoats as expendable sacrifices to assuage public opinion and by doing something to reestablish their reputation. In this the external threats need to be accompanied by positive internal inducements. If they do react to head off criticism, they should be reassured that there will be no unnecessary external interference with their selection processes. The selection and formation of internal elites is an important part of goal affirmation within an institution because promotions can be used as public rewards for those who visibly meet and achieve institutional goals. The upcoming elite is reinforced for giving exemplary commitment and effort to the promotion of the institution. In this way the leadership often can shape the internal values and behavior of members by giving public recognition to behavior which symbolizes the values desired. Institutions are usually much better at this than are instrumental organizations, where rewards, if they exist at all, are according to formula, therefore, routine and of little value as motivators.<sup>11</sup> Thus one of the subtle but important indicators of institutional tendencies is the use of prestige rewards within the organization as a way of forming employee values and of motivating them.

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<sup>11</sup> M. Crozier, *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1964: 13-19.

Selznick<sup>12</sup> makes much of the institutionalizing effect of the natural desire of human beings to be able to feel autonomous—that they be able to define their own personal and collective identities. A self-defined organizational identity, and the pride of belonging which goes with it, can be an unusually strong motivator within the group. This is another justification for wide sharing of information going into management decisions in order to motivate informed participation in definition of goals and of organizational policies. In short, care should be taken not to spoil the positive benefits of institutionalization. On the contrary, if the institutional bureaucracy voluntarily reforms itself, its achievement should be publicly acknowledged and acclaimed, and possibly rewarded by the assignment of additional functions and activities.

Reliance on institutional defense mechanisms alone to correct matters is obviously insufficient. Institutional bureaucracies can brazen things out. They can falsify information. They can intimidate critics. They can even buy off political leaders and defy public pressures. For these reasons, they have to be subject to special controls. No institutional bureaucracy should be able to audit its own accounts. Independent auditors should have the power to inspect the books at any time, to call for documents, and to take evidence on oath. They should be capable not only of conducting financial audits, but also performance audits, including measures of effectiveness, economy and efficiency, productivity, legality, morality, and public responsiveness. They should be required to make their findings public and to suggest remedies for observed failings. Their presence would not prevent the inspected body from doing any of these things for itself or defending itself in public from what it felt were unjust findings.

Such audits might be conducted on a periodic or cyclic basis rather than annually, and spot checks might be made on an irregular, unannounced and more frequent basis on the auditor's initiative or in response to public complaint. In any event a regular system of external audit would reveal whether administrative reform was justified, where priority attention should be placed, and what progress, if any, had occurred since the previous audit. Care should be taken to prevent the subversion of the auditors by inspected bodies. All too often in public administration supervisory bodies are actually controlled by the organizations they are supposed to superintend. If they are not controlled, they may become willing collaborators.

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<sup>12</sup> Selznick, *Leadership in Administration*, 21.

Systematic audit is helped by public action groups which function as watchdogs over institutional bureaucracies. These are not to be confused with pressure groups which seek to direct public policy to their own advantage. They are volunteer civic organizations that take it *on themselves to monitor* governmental performance and to watch over particular *public agencies* in the public interest. Often these public action groups clash with pressure groups. In agricultural policy, for instance, the public action groups might urge lower produce prices while *the* pressure groups urge higher produce prices. In any event, they try to prevent public agencies from falling into the hands of special interests on acting solely in their own interests. They may not have the professional competence of public auditors, but they can embarrass, humiliate, attack, expose, correct, sue, agitate harass and generally make such nuisances of themselves that eventually somebody must take notice. The best they can do *much to curb the* arrogance of institutional bureaucracies and through infiltration can themselves perform the function of political control. Like the auditors, they can play a crucial role in administrative reform.

The existence of public action groups is no substitute. However, for open government. Institutional bureaucracies are adept at hiding behind secrecy. They manufacture all kinds of excuses and rationalizations to hide what they do from the public. Actually, there are precious few reasons why public bodies cannot conduct all their business openly. Institutional bureaucracies should not be granted any special privileges: they are public and not private organizations. They should be subject to legal review, judicial challenge, freedom of access and information provisions, administrative appeal, public record requirements and the like, so that any member of the public if so minded can find out what is being done in the public's name. As little as possible should be hidden and institutional bureaucracies should not assume that they are exempt or special in any way from the normal obligations of public administrators. Without open government, administrative reform is severely handicapped.

The heart of the matter is the ability of an institutional bureaucracy to determine its own succession, it can act independently because it is assured that its leadership will be acceptable and will go along with what it is doing. It nominates its own leadership and because its leaders are usually drawn from within, or nominated by if the organization or closely identified with the organizational elite, it can perpetuate itself. While administrative reform is not impeded, it is certainly not eased. Apart from the obvious insistence on regular, open

selection procedures and clear limits on tenure, it would be desirable to reshuffle senior positions regularly to ensure continuous staff rotation so that no single individual or clique can dominate the organization or institutionalize their personal administrative styles for any appreciable length of time.

We have not here questioned whether institutionalization is good or bad or whether deinstitutionalization is an appropriate administrative reform strategy. We have merely acknowledged that reforming institutional bureaucracies involves something quite different than reforming instrumental bureaucracies. It is more complex politically as well as managerially. It is more idiosyncratic and generally slower. It is just as necessary, if not more so, despite the obvious difficulties we have outlined. We hope that our reflections throw some light on why this has been so and how administrative reformers might be oriented if they are to achieve better results in the future.



# 6

## “Development” and Administrative Reform

Muhammad Anisuzzaman  
Mohammad Mohabbat Khan

This chapter attempts to establish a relationship between "development" -political, administrative and economic-and administrative reform (AR). Although a remarkable diversity of approaches exists as to the concept of AR<sup>1</sup>, there seems a striking similarity among the approaches as to its goal. Nearly every approach seems to suggest that AR- defined broadly in terms of improved bureaucratic performance<sup>2</sup> is somewhat related to development-political, administrative and economic. This should not, however, give the impression that one knows for sure what constitutes political, administrative and economic development and what their ingredients are. Indeed, the following discussion indicates that the present knowledge level does not enable one to arrive at a consensus of the meaning and ingredients of development and perhaps much less about the role of AR in it. Yet as

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<sup>1</sup> See, M Anisuzzaman and M. M. Khan, 'Administrative Reform: Problems of Definition and Defining Characteristics' *Politics, Administration and Change* 5 (2: July-December) 1980.

<sup>2</sup> Lee addressing himself to the question as to why Administrative Reform is needed, opines that it (administrative reform) is “an effort to apply new ideas and combinations of ideas to an administrative *system* with a conscious view to *improving* the system for positive goals of national *development* (emphasis added). H-B Lee, ' The Concept. Structure and Strategy of Administrative Reform : An introduction” in H-B Lee and A. G. Samonte eds. *Administrative Reforms in Asia. Manila* : Eastern Regional Organization of Public Administration. 1970: 7; Lee has also referred to improving the system via administrative reform. Such an approach presupposes that administrative reform when implemented will improve the situation. H-B Lee. "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform" in A F. Leemans Ed. *The Management of Change in Government*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976:114-225 ; Backoff in an effort to operationalize administrative reform, suggests that while administrative reform's focus is on society at large, bureaucratic reforms are more closely related to governmental performance. R. Backoff, "Operationalizing Administrative Reform for Improved Governmental Performance", *Administration and Society* ( May ) 1974: 73-106.

the discussion shows, there can hardly be any doubt about the significance of AR affecting development, however defined.

A leading contemporary scholar, Waldo holds that "the most serious thinking in the area of administrative reform has concerned the concept of *development* (emphasis in the original) during the past five or ten years"<sup>3</sup> Lee's concern for national development and Backoff's quest for improving overall governmental performance indicate their development orientations. It is thus necessary to understand the meaning of the term 'development' so frequently used in the contemporary literature and its contribution, if any, toward understanding administrative reform.

What, then, is meant by the term 'development'? And how is it related to AR? Waldo comes up with an interesting prefatory statement: It has been observed (as by Carl Becker) that each era has certain concepts which are so central and crucial in the definition of meaning and value that their own meaning and value is taken for granted, Patently, in this period "development" is such a concept."<sup>4</sup> Over the years, he has been a keen observer of the term. Waldo<sup>5</sup> is intrigued by it and finds it impossible to define development<sup>6</sup> with precision. Yet the literature on developments is legion and still growing.

### **Approaches to Development**

Yet some definitions have been offered. Esman for one, suggests that "development or modernization is a social process which can be influenced in large measure by human design. Activity related to development is normatively directed toward the overriding and

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<sup>3</sup> Waldo indicated this line of thinking to M. Anisuzzaman in a memorandum at Syracuse University on October 28, 1974, 1. Earlier he regarded comparative administration and development administration as "...two active centers of scholarly and professional interest and activity. Both are important in orienting public administration toward change and development. They may in fact be the most important source of ideas; certainly they will be major channels for the conveyance of ideas". D. Waldo, "Public Administration and Change: Terra Paena Incognita" *Journal of Comparative Administration* 1 (May) 1969: 108.

<sup>4</sup> D. Waldo, 'Reflections on Public Administration and National Development,' *International Social Science Journal* 21, 1969: 296.

<sup>5</sup> D. Waldo, *Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Problems and Promise*. Chicago: Comparative Administration Group, American Society for public Administration, 1964.

<sup>6</sup> For a general coverage of the area, see E. de Vries, "A Review of Literature on Development Theory," *International Development Review* 10 ( March ) 1968 : 48-49,

interrelated goals of nation building and socio-economic progress. It is possible to develop a rational theory of action for the pursuit of these goals.<sup>7</sup> Note that Esman equates development with modernization. A position which may be contested on both normative and historical grounds. Was there development before a modern period or the industrial revolution? Were governments before 1780, for example, not at all concerned with no socio– economic development? Esman, however, mentions that the above is one approach to development and that there are contrary positions.

According to such a position, development is primarily a historical evolutionary process which can be influenced only marginally by purposeful effect. Action within this context is not necessarily goal–rational and therefore not amenable to normative action theory.

Esman hints at the artificiality of the effort by referring to "human design"<sup>8</sup> and he connects this effort to the twin goals of "nation–building" and "socio-economic progress." Although he uses terms like nation building (frequently employed in the LDC's), he does not specify or spell them out at length. The reader gets an impression that–somehow nation building is intimately related to socio-economic progress, or that nation building is socio-economic progress.

Such formulations are indeed very broad in scope and make development all inclusive in dimension.

If one accepts John Locke's assertion that a state is a limited liability concern whose business it is to promote life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, such a formulation could suggest development as defined by Esman. The U. S. constitutional theory holds the rationale of its existence by underscoring the Lockean theory as to 'life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.'

Yet the United States government does not seem to have a consciously held theory of development. Or as Waldo<sup>9</sup> puts it more comprehensively, "...The defining characteristics of modernity in the west may not have been achieved by an effort, consciously and

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<sup>7</sup> Milton J. Esman, "The Politics of Development Administration", in J. D. Montgomery and W. J. Siffin eds. *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*. New York : McGraw Hill, 1966: 107.

<sup>8</sup> On the concept of human design, see H. Simon, *The Significance of Artificial*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969.

<sup>9</sup> Waldo, "Reflections on Public Administration and National Development," 297.

nominally, to develop'...<sup>10</sup> Although Waldo would prefer a concern with "human development" to a concern with "national development," a number of scholars have addressed themselves to the problem of national development and the role of public administration in it.

### **Political and Administrative Development**

Such expositions would seem to present the age-old concerns with ends and means or goals and strategies: If the goal of country S is Y, then one of the ways to achieve Y is Z. As Siffin puts it "...training and education, the modernization of processes for the management of administrative resources (personnel, funds, supplies), and the efforts to increase the performance capabilities of bureaucracies 'in general' have been prime targets to attack by administrative developers as well as students of administrative development,"<sup>11</sup> Thus, although a connection is established between administrative resource and governmental performance, it also raises the question of political development to which this administrative development must relate. Administrative development, administrative modernization, or AR are by themselves meaningless unless related to the goals of the polity. This will lead logically to the next question: Is administrative development political development? One cannot answer this question in advance without defining political development, another very controversial issue.

For Siffin, administrative development and political development are inseparable. 'Studies of administration inspired by concerns with development have shown, too, that it is not possible to draw sharp lines between administration, politics, and society itself when one gropes for answers to questions about "nation-budding," or about the improvement of administrative performance in any say the narrowest, smallest dimension.'<sup>12</sup>

Diamant<sup>13</sup> suggests the following as a "basic definition": "1. A political system is said to be developing when there is an increase in its

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<sup>10</sup> However, Waldo in a later paper notes significant similarities or convergences between the "advanced" industrial countries and the "later developing" countries in terms of the emerging nature of problems. Rather than dichotomizing between "developed" and "developing" he argues that all countries are developing. D. Waldo, "Toward World Development?" Paper presented at the Workshop on Bureaucracy and Development held at Albara. The Sudan, on February 8-13, 1975, Mimeographed.

<sup>11</sup> W. J. Siffin, "Introduction" in Montgomery and Siffin eds. *Approaches to Development*, 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>13</sup> A. Diamant, "Political Development: Approaches to Theory and Strategy" in Montgomery and Siffin eds, *Approaches to Development*, 25-26.

ability to sustain successfully and continuously new types of social goals and the creation of new types of organization. 2. For political development to continue over time a differentiated and centralized policy must come into being which must be able to command resources from and power over other spheres and regions of the society."<sup>14</sup> Diamant seems to stress new goals and new organizations as indicative of political development. The central government has a crucial roles<sup>15</sup> in this task of creating new goals and organizations. In this view, Diamant seems to be influenced by Eisenstadt.

Basing his views on his data from the analysis of the historic bureaucratic societies, Eisenstaedt<sup>16</sup> (1963a : 96-119) defines political development as the ability of a political system to sustain continuously new types of political demands and organizations.<sup>17</sup> In Eisenstaedt's formulation, political modernization has two general traits: (1) a high degree of differentiation, unification, and centralization of the political system; and (2) the continuous development of a high-level of resources and political power. The focus on the centralized administration for effective operation as held by both Diamant and Eisenstadt is also reinforced by Hoselitz

*"Political modernization in the new nations of Asia and Africa implies, among many other things, a transfer of a person's loyalty from a small, particularistic group to a large entity, ideally to the entire nation. In some societies this process takes place step wise as, for example, in India, where linguistic groups and linguistically defined states intervene between the small particularistic group (caste, tribe, or village community) and the nation as a whole, There exist similar interstitial structures in other countries, e. g., Nigeria or Indonesia, which plainly*

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<sup>14</sup> Also see A. Diamant, *Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes : A Bureaucratic Model for Developing Societies*, Bloomington : Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper, 1964, 5.

<sup>15</sup> The creation of a central authority with the capacity to control a given territory as a process of state building is also recognized by Weiner See M Weiner, 'Political Integration and Political Development' in C. E. Welch, Jr. ed. *Political Modernization*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1967: 150-166.

<sup>16</sup> S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Bureaucracy and Political Development' in J. LaPalombara ed. *Bureaucracy and Political Development* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963: 96-119.

<sup>17</sup> Also relevant is his monumental work, see S N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empire*. London : Collier-Macmillan, 1963.

*acknowledge this federated character, but we find then even in countries which do not officially acknowledge time...*<sup>18</sup>

Through such processes, the polity undergoes change or transformation which, in the views of these scholars, enhances the polity's ability to deal with problems. However, this is a limited approach, to be sure. A polity or a political system cannot perform just one function or produce a single product. As Pye suggests, the political system must not just solve problems, it also must have "scope with insoluble issues and it must provide people with a sense of identity and of fundamental membership in a large community."<sup>19</sup>

To define political development solely in terms of problem solving ability or increasing its capacity to do-is to ignore the deeper and more meaningful ability of the system. Yet things must get done on time and according to a schedule. Day-to-day problems must be resolved and to do this is to emphasize the role of the public bureaucracies-through which, largely if not entirely, implementation of policies is generally sought. Hence, the focus is on administrative development or AR.

In this connection, it may be relevant and useful to refer to Lee's concept of "administrative innovation". Lee identifies two major conditions for innovation within a bureaucracy. "One is administrative, the other is political. The existence of innovational enclaves within the bureaucracy does not automatically lead to diffusion of administrative innovation... the crucial condition for enabling innovational enclaves to come to the center is the existence of strong political elites that are ready to take up the task of identifying and fostering potential innovators among the civil servants..."<sup>20</sup>

Lee then relates the innovational role on the part of the higher civil servants to rapid social and political change.<sup>21</sup> He views the essence of

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<sup>18</sup> B. Hoselitz. "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures", in Palombara ed. *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 191.

<sup>19</sup> L. Pye "Introduction" in Pye ed. *Communication and Political Development*. Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1963. 16.

<sup>20</sup> H-B Lee, "The Role of the Higher Civil Service Under Rapid Social and Political Change" in E W. Weidner ed. *Development Administration in Asia*. Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1970 : 114-116,

<sup>21</sup> Of relevance is the work that suggests the crucial role of the "rational productivity bureaucracy" (by which is meant economic planners in the public service.) These planners' jobs are to "insure the supply of the factors of production at predictable and plannable levels, to preserve, extend, or project

administration in developing countries as the smooth and creative management of the change process. Thus, development for Lee is "a process of acquiring a sustained growth of a system's capability to cope with new continuous changes toward the achievement of progressive political, economic and social objectives."<sup>22</sup> In a similar vein, Abueva views administrative development as :

*...the increasing ability of the political system or polity of any country to implement its collective decisions. The bureaucracy is the major structure for performing this implementing function, and it may also play a role in making those decisions. But many actors other than those who populate the bureaucracy, headed by the chief executive, are often implicated in administration: legislators and other elected officials, the party members, perhaps the military, the members of organizations and associations, the citizens all of whom participate in one way or another in making and carrying out decisions for the nation and who are subject to their application.*"<sup>23</sup>

In both formulations (by Lee and Abueva) stress is on political development which is to be achieved via administrative development.

Inherent assumptions in such approaches are that there are indeed many deterrents (obstacles, bottleneck deficiencies, shortcomings) to development. Not least among these are administrative deterrents which can be offset to some extent by largesse in other areas. As Caiden argues, administrative reform is thus essential ingredient of development in any country irrespective of the speed and direction of change simply because administrative capacity becomes increasingly important in the implementation of new policies, plans, and ideas."<sup>24</sup> Caiden is not alone underscoring this. The Brookings Institution Symposium stated that lack of administrative reform has retarded

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the parameters of foreign commerce, and to foster industrial innovation through research and development activity." See W. F. Ilchman. "Productivity, Administrative Reform and Antipolitics" in R. Braibanti ed, *Political and Administrative Development*. Durham. N. C: Duke University Press, 1969: 477. Another related work is R. Bendix, *Nation Building and Citizenship*. New York : Doubleday, 1969,

<sup>22</sup> Lee, "The Role of the Higher Civil Service," 108.

<sup>23</sup> J. V. Abueva. "Administrative Reform and Culture" in Lee and Samonte eds. *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, 108.

<sup>24</sup> G. E. Caiden, "Development Administration and Administrative Reform," *International Social Science Journal* 21, 1969 : 13

development in any form".<sup>25</sup> Stone goes much further mentioned that the primary obstacles to development are administrative and political, not economic".<sup>26</sup>

Administrative development must relate to administrative considerations requiring or involving suitable modification, change or innovations in administrative philosophy, practices and prognoses. Perhaps these innovations (modification and changes in administrative philosophy, practices and prognoses) suiting the goals of the regime-constitute what one might designate administrative reform (AR). And perhaps at this point when the AR's are related to the achievement of overall continuous change objectives of the polity (political system, the interface between administrative development and AR appears and becomes meaningful. In other words, ARs are constituent elements in any theory of administrative development and/or political development.

Some contemporary analysts have also directed considerable examination to this aspect. Earlier attention was called to Lee's definition of AR as "an effort to apply new ideas and combinations of ideas to an administrative system with a conscious view to improving the system for positive goals of national development".<sup>27</sup> Siagian<sup>28</sup> carries the Lee concept further "any consciously planned change sought and brought about within an administrative system for the purpose of facilitating the implementation of development plans through a higher degree of performance level". It is apparent that these two concepts have much in common. Both refer to administrative systems with respect to "improving the system" or "a higher degree of performance level" of the system to achieve some kind of national goals through facilitating the implementation of development plans", etc. Thus, the notion of administrative development finally boils down to AR when viewed as improving the administrative system to meet desired changes in the polity.

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<sup>25</sup> Brookings Institution, Symposium on 'Research Needs Regarding the Development of Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Countries. Washington, D.C. Part III, 1966: 8.

<sup>26</sup> D. Stone, "Public Administration and Nation Building" in R. C. Martin ed. *Public Administration in Democracy*. Syracuse : Syracuse University Press, 1965 : 258.

<sup>27</sup> Lee, "The Concept, Structure and Strategy of Administrative Reform," 7.

<sup>28</sup> S. Siagian, 'Improving Indonesia's Administrative Infrastructure: A Case Study', in Lee and Samonteeds. *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, 96.



Although the interconnections between AR and administrative development have been identified, the language in which these connections are presented is still very broad, and to a degree vague. The first difficulty is to define the "administrative system" and its constituent elements as the former interacts with the political system or polity in almost indistinguishable manner. One cannot thus meaningfully say: here administration stops and politics begins. The second difficulty-which follows from the first is one of operationalizing the "goals of national development" in administrative terms. How are the interconnections with the non-administrative variables to be worked out? One is reminded of Backoff<sup>29</sup> that non-administrative variables significantly affect AR. The third difficulty is presented by the "higher degree of performance level." Are ARs then a matter of degree and not of a "kind" different enough to merit systematic treatment?

### **Development Administration**

These considerations lead to a discussion of "development administration" as administrative development where in approach this aspect of "degree" has been used as a rationale. Swerdlow contends that the tasks of a more "pioneering" nature are different compared to the routine tasks operated in a long established organization or regular public administration. As he argues :

*...poor countries have special characteristics that tend to create a different role for government. These characteristics and this expanded or emphasized role of government, particularly as it affects economic growth, tend to make the operations of the public administrator significantly different. Where such differences exist, public administration can be usefully called development administration.<sup>30</sup>*

Anybody familiar with the poor countries would tend to agree with Swerdlow. In fact, the process enhances the ability of a government to get things done. Rigg's definition supports Swerdlow's contention : "...development administration refers not only to a government's

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<sup>29</sup> Backoff, "Operationalizing Administrative Reform," 104,

<sup>30</sup> Irving Swerdlow, "Introduction" in Swerdlow ed. *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems*. Syracuse : Syracuse University Press, 1963 ; XIV.

efforts to carry out programs designed to reshape its physical, human, and cultural environment, but also to struggle to enlarge a government's capacity to engage in such programs."<sup>31</sup> Riggs considers political and administrative development "a necessary condition" for success in the administration of development projects.

Thus, development administration should be distinguished from economic development at least conceptually, even though these two are intimately related. Development administration is a much broader term than economic development which can be explained in terms of growth rates (per capita G N P and the like). There are no such indices to refer to development administration. Development administration can be meaningfully thought of as a system of values or social preferences which a government holds at a given time as governing the public actions designed to reflect those cherished norms. It has, therefore, two crucial elements: (1) development administration as a carrier of innovating values<sup>32</sup> and/or political, economic and social objectives authoritatively determined<sup>33</sup> and (2) creation and operation of new organizations and institutions to reflect these values and objectives. These two elements point a goal direction. As Weidner maintains

*If there are no development goals, there is no development administration. Development administration in government refers to the processes of guiding an organization toward the achievement of progressive political, economic and social objectives that are authoritatively determined in one manner or another. The focus is on a single kind of value... Development is a state of mind, a tendency, a direction...*<sup>34</sup>

Landau refers to it as "the engineering of social change".<sup>35</sup> Lapalombara, Braibanti, Pye, and Spengler suggest that a prime requirement for development is a change in the 'content of man's

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<sup>31</sup> F. W. Riggs, "The Context of Development Administration" Riggs ed. *Frontiers of Development Administration*, Durham N. C.: Duke University Press, 1970: 75.

<sup>32</sup> M. Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration" Swerdlow ed, *Development Administration*, 2

<sup>33</sup> E. Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus of Research" in F. Heady and S. L. Stokes eds. *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*. Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962, 98.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, 98-99.

<sup>35</sup> M. Landau, "Development Administration and Decision Theory", in Weidner ed. *Development Administration in Asia*; 74,

minds" in the direction of empiricism. LaPalombara<sup>36</sup> or, as Meadows<sup>37</sup> would like to view it, 'Development administration is an act of imagination which attracts, fires, holds, and elaborates the loyalties of human beings engaged in goal directed change.' Manirojana characterizes development administration as "a relevant response to reality."<sup>38</sup>

These connotations of development administration might have a variety of impressions-ranging from a normative political culture through psychology to public administration applied to poor countries. But in all these there seems one unmistakable sign: development administration viewed as administrative development requiring suitable changes in knowledge, skills, and values of public bureaucracies who bear the major brunt of the process of development is indeed a crucible deserving most serious attention.

### **Bureaucracy and Political Development**

Another issue yet unresolved should be noted in this discussion on administrative development. This is the issue of bureaucracy and political development. While it is of considerable importance that administrative capacity be improved or modernized to deal with the emerging needs and demands, it is also to be examined if a continued concern for rapid bureaucratic development to accelerate “nation building” leads to bureaucratization of the social processes, and to the extent this is so, whether or not it impedes political growth and maturity.

A leader in this regard is Riggs who fears that “bureaucracies in the low-income countries... because they are already too strong to be controlled or held accountable to non-bureaucratic forces which are relatively weak – might arrest political growth and maturity (maximization of democratic processes in the Western sense). As he elaborates his theme, ...premature or too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy when the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the

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<sup>36</sup> J. La Palombara. *Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging Nations*. Bloomington: Comparative Administration Group, Occasional Paper, 1965.

<sup>37</sup> P. Meadow, 'Motivation for Change and Development in Administration' in Swerdlow ed. *Development Administration*, 85-102.

<sup>38</sup> P. Manirojana, "Development with an Emphasis on Change" in Irving Swerdlow and Marcus Ingle eds. *Public Administration Training for the Less Developed Countries*. Syracuse University Press, 1974 : 14.

development of effective politics ...separate political institutions have a better chance to grow if bureaucratic institutions are relatively weak".<sup>39</sup> Riggs makes a distinction between political process and bureaucracy.

Braibanti, on the other hand, takes the position that the strengthening of administration is of paramount importance and that it cannot wait until the maturity of the political processes. He argues that reforms aiming at strengthening of administration "must proceed irrespective of the rate of maturation of the political process",<sup>40</sup> However, this does not appear to be a serious intellectual confrontation. Braibanti later allows some degree of flexibility. He, too, recognizes the eventual supremacy of the political processes over the administrative. As Braibanti put it, "...I would go so far as to suggest that in the long run, an administrative apparatus must be sustained by doctrinal or ideological supports derived from the social order"<sup>41</sup> He, however, makes a point that it is beyond the capacity of an aid-giving nation to directly and deliberately accelerate politicization and that is one reason why administrative reforms must proceed suggesting that an asymmetrical or unbalanced growth of the polity is understandable.

The basic idea which emerges from these arguments is that administrative development is a prerequisite for development of low-income countries. Braibanti has no reservation in taking this position. He argues that administrative development will generate some forces which will eventually contribute to political development in these countries.

*...For example, the modernization of administration may set in motion forces which activate modernizing irritants in the political realm. Thus the establishment of courses in administration and politics in universities tends to break the monopoly of a bureaucratic state on administrative learning by diffusing into the body politic what were formerly secrets of the trade. The*

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<sup>39</sup> F. W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View" in LaPalombara ed. *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, 126.

<sup>40</sup> R. Braibanti, "External Inducement of Political and Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy" in Braibanti ed. *Political and Administrative Development*, 3.

<sup>41</sup> R. Braibanti, "Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Growth" in Riggs ed. *Frontiers of Development Administration*, 229.

*establishment of departments of administration or training institutes may result in diffusing forms to other segments of education thus increasing their potential as a countervailing force in the society.*<sup>42</sup>

Thus, in Braibanti's view, administrative reform will contribute rather substantially to political growth. He does not, therefore, differ markedly from Riggs in the latter's emphasis on political growth. In fact, the end of both these scholars is the same—achieving political maturation. They differ in means. For Riggs separate political institutions should be developed and strengthened and administrative reforms should be allowed to the extent that these are not inhibitive or even slow down such growth. For Braibanti, it will not serve any purpose to wait for political maturity. He would go ahead with administrative reforms especially when these reforms have a capacity to generate political irritants in the polity. Sigelman reexamined the issue and found that “the presence of a relatively modern administrative system is a necessary precondition of, not a hindrance to, societal modernization, including political development.”<sup>43</sup> However, Daland<sup>44</sup> points out that no data presently exists to support or refute Sigelman's conclusion.

### **Economic Development**

Somewhat related, yet a distinct issue, is the role of public bureaucracy in economic development. It seems that this issue should be presented as a corollary to bureaucracy and political development for, in the last analysis, economic development must find its meaning in the political development.

It may be useful to discuss the formulations of Stone, Caiden, and the United Nations, among others, in this context. Recognizing that a variety of developmental purposes are served by government organizations, Stone seeks to capitalize on the significance of development administration. From an intensive review of the organizations of nine countries and execution of development programs, he comes up with a number of generalizations :

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 241-242

<sup>43</sup> L. Sigelman, “Do Modern Bureaucracies Dominate Underdeveloped Politics? A Test of the Imbalance Thesis,” *American Political Science Review* 66 (June) 1972: 525-528.

<sup>44</sup> R. T. Daland, “Communication,” *American Political Science Review*, 67 (March) 1973: 197-198.

*The primary obstacles to development are administrative rather than economic, and not deficiencies in natural resources.*

*Countries generally lack administrative capabilities for implementing plans and programs.*

*Countries share in common most of the same administrative problems and obstacles.*

*A great deal of untapped knowledge and experience is available in respect to the development of effective organization to plan and administer comprehensive development programs.*

*Most persons charged with planning and other development responsibilities in individual countries, as well as persons made available under technical assistance programs, do not have adequate knowledge or adaptability in designing and installing organizations, institutions, and procedures suitable for the particular country.<sup>45</sup>*

Such a position- that the primary obstacles to development are administrative-needs careful consideration. It holds that as one improves or modernizes administrative capacity, the result is development. Perhaps Stone would need to convince economists and political scientists. It is possible to reduce such a complex phenomenon as development to mere lack of administrative capability for implementing plans and programs or to *designing and installing organizations, institutions and procedures?* (Emphasis added.)

This question, one is afraid, cannot be answered exclusively by reference to organizations, skills and procedures. True, organizations, skills, procedures when perfected or refined go a long way in increasing productivity, administrative and otherwise. But to make these techniques appear as the major ingredients of development is perhaps to assume much and ignore much more.

However, Stone's generalizations find support in a contemporary analyst of AR. Referring to the administration of foreign aid programs, Caiden notes that "proficient specialists" have been frustrated by poor administration. As he observes :

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<sup>45</sup> D. Stone, "Government Machinery Necessary for Development" in M. Kriesberg ed. *Public Administration in Developing Countries*. Washington. D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1965: 53.

*They were no longer working in organizational societies with bureaucratic people; theirs was a new world. Nothing seemed to work properly. Time was perceived differently. Cooperation was halfhearted. Business was more personal. The society lacked proper institutions. The organizations lacked proper methods. The people lacked proper skills. What was needed, said the administrative experts, was the accumulated wisdom of the Western administrative system; the new world had to be made in to image of the world. So bureaucratization was essential. Institution building unavoidable, and Western administrative folklore indispensable.<sup>46</sup>*

The United Nations in a number of publications underscored the importance of improving public administration. One publication was meant to be a clear restatement of the basic elements in a program of public administrative improvement in developing countries.

It summarized the current concepts and practices of public administration, especially as related to the developing countries. A major conclusion of this publication is that "administrative improvement is the *sine qua non* in the implementation of programs of national development".<sup>47</sup> Another UN publication holds, "A sound system of public administration contributes as directly as possible to the economic and social development of the nations and to the raising of the level of economic security and social welfare of the population".<sup>48</sup>

Such orientations explain why the UN organized several seminars on AR and management improvement in developing countries in recent years. As Caiden in a seminar paper claims, "Administrative Reform is probably the most important measure to be taken to increase the capability and effectiveness of administrative systems so necessary in the formulation and implementation of development plans and

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<sup>46</sup> G. E. Caiden, *The Dynamics of Public Administration*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. 1971, 266.

<sup>47</sup> United Nations, Technical Assistance Program, *A Handbook of Public Administration: Current Concepts and Practices with Special Reference to Developing Countries*. New York: U.N., 1961.

<sup>48</sup> United Nations, Technical Assistance Administration, *Standards and Techniques of Public Administration with Special Reference to Technical Assistance for Underdeveloped Countries*. New York: U.N., 1951.

problems".<sup>49</sup> The assumption in all these publications seems to be that economic development means "implementation of development plans and programs", and implementation of development plans and programs means reforming public bureaucracies accordingly. AR thus assumes a crucial significance in economic development.

Probably no one would dispute the role of AR in equipping the public bureaucracies with the necessary orientation (values) and tools (knowledge and skills). One would concede that AR is one of the major variables involved. But one might not be sure as to just how far this contribution of AR should be carried or what weight should be assigned to it in the overall economic development.

Even economists find increasingly difficult to explain economic growth in pure economic terms alone. As Hagen insists that to understand economic growth he would himself have to master the literature of psychology, anthropology and sociology Referring to the question of why some officials in Burma did not use resources more effectively, he holds, "Since it seemed clear to me that differences were due only in very minor degree to economic obstacles, lack of information, or lack of training, I turned my attention to other possible causes of differences in human behavior to differences in personality, and hence personality formation and the social conditions affecting it".<sup>50</sup>

*Swerdlow, although especially notes that public administrators are deeply involved in the problems of economic growth, he cautions: Public administrators must understand economic growth in terms of governmental operations. The modernization process is far more than mere economic growth, though economic growth is probably the easiest element of the process to understand and manipulate. Economic growth occurs not just from economic activity. But from the interaction of political, social changes that are inextricably interrelated in mutual causative fashion with economic changes.*<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> G. E. Caiden, "Impact and Implications of Administrative Reform for Administrative Behavior and Performance" in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*. Vol. 2, New York, 1973: 26,

<sup>50</sup> E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins*. Homewood: Dorsey, 1962 .ix.

<sup>51</sup> See Swerdlow, ed. *Development Administration*.



Colm and Geiger also echo a similar point of view

*In the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, **development requires social and cultural change as well as economic growth** (emphasis added); that is, qualitative transformation must occur concurrently with quantitative increases. There is, in fact, a reciprocal relation between the two, and neither process is likely to continue for long or go very far without the other. Hence, **development change plus growth.**<sup>52</sup> (Emphasis added).*

Such observations assume crucial significance when one tries to understand the phenomenon of crises in many polities amid apparent economic growth such as the one recently seen in Pakistan in 1971. For over ten years (1961-1971) Pakistan was cited by many Western scholars as a "success story" of rapid economic growth<sup>53</sup> via effective utilization of resources, organizations, skills and techniques. Pakistan was also cited by many Western scholars as involved in modernizing its administrative apparatus through a number of ARs. Pakistan's bureaucracy was described by Braibanti as "an excellent bureaucracy where higher ranking members could compete, in terms of their ability to manage complexity, with the bureaucrats of any nation in the world".<sup>54</sup> Yet everything fell, including all the spectacular economic growth and the 'excellent bureaucracy' instrumental in bringing about the growth on the shores of political discontent.

## Conclusions

The discussion so far suggests that AR cannot be examined in rational terms as improved organizations, skills, and techniques. However useful is AR organizations, skills and techniques are inadequate by themselves without a value framework within which they must operate.

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<sup>52</sup> G. Colm and T. Geiger, "Country Programming as a Guide to Development", in *Development of the Emergent Countries*. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institute, 1962: 47.

<sup>53</sup> See, G. Papanek, *Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives*. Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1967; Papanek, "Pakistan's Growth in the Mixed Economy" Paper read at the Conference on Planning and Growth under a Mixed Economy held in Istanbul, Turkey in August-September, 1965,

<sup>54</sup> R. Braibanti. 'Pakistan's Experiment in Political Development,' *Asia Supplement I* (Fall) 1974 : 35

For AR presupposes preferences something for something else. Whenever a particular AR is introduced, it is believed that this AR is going to do some good. If not, why should it be introduced at all?

If this assumption holds true, it brings up the question: Whose belief is most relevant to AR? It is submitted that in any country the belief is primarily that of the administrative reformer. It is held that in any country, especially at the national level, the administrative reformer is the chief executive. Under any conditions, chief executives would matter most in matters of administration for they are the leaders in their administration. This role becomes all the more pronounced when parallel institutions like the legislature, courts, and informed and interested civic bodies are either relatively weak or absent. The latter seems to be the case in many LDCs. Therefore, to understand AR, one must understand the administrative doctrine of the administrative reformer.

The argument is that unless the ARs are related to the administrative doctrine of the reformer, a realistic understanding is denied at least to the extent the reformer is free to fashion AR or his preferred doctrine is defined as the body of principles on which a regime bases its actions and policies. More specifically, it refers to the preferences both theoretical and practical-of the chief executive on which generally administrative action is based when they have such preferences.

Such preference might be endorsed by the legislature, or these might be modified but rarely challenged by the legislature. For the legislature is not particularly concerned with day-to-day administration which it entrusts to the executive. The legislature is concerned with the making of laws. Thus, the chief executive is remarkably free to fashion or refashion or reform the administrative machinery in the way he likes. The court generally intervenes after the fact when something has reportedly gone wrong. Both the legislature and courts normally expect the administrative machinery particularly the bureaucrats to execute or apply the laws passed by the legislature without fear or favor, and to perform other activities as directed by the executive.

Informed citizenry of groups or institutions might take some initiative in AR, but generally they do not simply because there are very few or in many cases, no such institutions operate in the LDCs. The bureaucracies themselves might press for AR but they are

generally concerned with intra-organizational reforms which have limited purpose and do not at all restrict the chief executive's authority in providing overall guidance and leadership for AR.

The concern, it is argued in this chapter, ought to be with the overall AR and its consequences for the entire administration rather than with micro AR such as a revision of standard operating procedures, from designing work load analysis, system and procedures study, O & M, and the like. While the latter are important, they are important only intra-organizationally. Their effect on overall administration is minimal. The macro AR is of much greater importance as it relates to those policies and practices which affect the very structure of administration itself particularly the status bureaucrats gain or lose through AR as 'development' activity expands.